# 1NC

## 1NC — Off

### 1NC — T

#### Our interpretation is that the AFF must defend a tactical and exportable method from this space that exemplifies the resolution in a net beneficial way to the status quo.

**“Should” determines fiat – it’s a question of our methods for achieving the resolution, not an instrumental question of *political process***

**Copley, 06** (Bridget, “**What *should* should mean?**”, semanticist jointly affiliated with the [CNRS](http://www.cnrs.fr) and [Université Paris 8](http://www.univ-paris8.fr), <http://copley.free.fr/copley.should.pdf>)

Example 15b: **The beer should be cold** by now,but I have absolutely no idea whether it is. The judgment for must in (15a) makes sense on the traditional view; if you use must, and thereby convey that on all of the most plausible epistemically possible worlds the beer is cold, it would be strange to then comment that you have no idea whether it is or not, giving rise to an instance of Moore’s Paradox.3 The question is why the sentence in (15b) is not also an instance of Moore’s Paradox. **By the traditional view of should, the speaker is conveying that on most of the most plausible epistemically accessible worlds, the beer is cold**. So if you utter (15b), there must be some reason why most of your most plausible epistemically accessible worlds are p-worlds. [The author defines a p-world as a world in which p is true – for instance, “the beer is cold.”] Perhaps you saw someone put the beer in the fridge. But the fact that there is some reason that the beer is cold on most of the worlds you are considering, is reason enough why you should not be able to assert that you have absolutely no idea if it is cold or not. You do have some idea.

#### The “core” antitrust laws are the Sherman Act, Clayton Act, and FTC Act—from the topic paper

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U.S. antitrust law is defined by federal and state statutes, as interpreted by the courts. The core federal statutes are the Sherman Act,1 passed by Congress in 1890, and the Federal Trade Commission2 and Clayton Acts,3 both passed in 1914. The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) (together the “agencies”) share enforcement of most areas of federal antitrust law but with some differences in the scope of their authority. The FTC has sole authority to enforce Section 5 of FTC Act, which prohibits (1) unfair methods of competition and (2) unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The FTC almost always pursues claims for anticompetitive conduct as unfair methods of competition and reserves charges of unfair or deceptive acts or practices for consumer protection violations. Though the FTC's authority to challenge unfair methods of competition goes beyond conduct prohibited by the Sherman and Clayton Acts, in practice the FTC brings most unfair methods of competition cases under the same standards that courts apply to Sherman Act claims. The most prominent exception is the invitation to collude offense, which falls outside the scope of the Sherman Act (if the invitation is not accepted, there is no agreement). The FTC challenges invitations to collude as so-called “standalone” violations of Section 5.4 The DOJ has sole authority to pursue criminal violations of the antitrust laws. Most states have their own state antitrust and unfair competition statutes. State law follows federal law to some extent, though as discussed below, may differ from federal law in meaningful ways that vary state to state. State attorneys general and private parties can also typically file suit to enforce both federal and state antitrust law.

#### It's the best model —

#### 1 — Method Testing — there’s two internal links —

#### Negative Ground — there’s no stable role of the negative in a world where the AFF can defend any epistemic, ontological, or discursive position they want — shuts out every argument from the crackdown DA, to the, to capitalism kritiks of the way in which different AFFs theorize power and organize against those systems. Only a model in which the negative can prove disadvantages and countermethods to their strategy can ensure a stable topic for both sides.

#### Revolutionary Education — understanding the ways in which we deploy methods out there is necessary for us to theorize in here — only our interpretation preserves intellectual openness through iterative testing that guarantee depth and breadth in theorizing solutions to the harms of the 1AC — it’s a better way to translate their offense because it allows us to apply their theory of power to tactical strategies — saves millions of lives because the stakes in here are low but are high out there so we must be investing time into discussions of those strategies. Debate can train activists and organizers on how to act against the state that forces the state into stances or actions contrary to its self-interest

#### 2 — Checks affirmative bias —

#### Not being able to negate via a tactics model means the AFF always wins because the affirmative can always be more ahead at a level of ethics in metaphysics debates

#### That causes psychic violence — their model forces debate over form rather than content — causes every debate to be about debaters instead of methods which collapses the activity because their model devolves into every 2AR being the “performative disad” rather than discussion of real-world violence — turns any ethical imperative to their framing of the 1AC and is a terminal solvency deficit to their method.

#### 3 — If they spill up to a tactical method then they meet at a level of effects because they would only meet based off of the telos of their solvency through reclarification — voter for fairness and academic irresponsibility because the affirmative can skirt out of all negative offense in a world where they can defend end goals but not the processes integral to those goals.

### 1NC — K

#### The embracement of ungovernability is a tactic taken right from neoliberalism’s back pocket – ungovernable subjects enable the expansion of colonial power to the smallest levels, justifying endless intervention into the periphery by Western power – at best, the aff only results in neoliberal self-help schemes that confirm the power of the biopolitical present

Marei et al. 18  
(Fouad Gehad Marei, Research Fellow, Center for Middle Eastern and North African Politics, Free University of Berlin, Germany. Mona Atia, Associate Professor of Geography and International Affairs, George Washington University, USA. Lisa Bhungalia, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Kent State University, USA. Omar Dewachi, Assistant Professor of Anthropology, Social Medicine, and Global Health, American University in Beirut, Lebanon. “Interventions on the politics of governing the “ungovernable”” Political Geography [https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0962629817301385?\_rdoc=1&\_fmt=high&\_origin=gateway&\_docanchor=&md5=b8429449ccfc9c30159a5f9aeaa92ffb&ccp=y#](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0962629817301385?_rdoc=1&_fmt=high&_origin=gateway&_docanchor=&md5=b8429449ccfc9c30159a5f9aeaa92ffb&ccp=y)! rvs)

Introduction Fouad Gehad Marei and Mona Atia As postcolonial theorists argue, the metropole uses the colony as a laboratory. We propose that the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in particular has served as a laboratory for “global” interventions (Chakrabarty, 2000, Chatterjee, 2004, Spivak, 1988, Stoler, 1995), and is therefore an instructive site. We offer theoretical and methodological reflections on the concept of ungovernability, informed by rescaled empirical inquiries conducted not in the spirit of empiricism but in the spirit of shaping theory. This intervention does not seek to theorize governance or coin new concepts, but rather it spatializes and grounds how life is managed in different geographies, across distinct thematic areas, and in relation to global interventions, colonial violences (past, present, and “yet to come”), and regimes of racial differentiation and classification. Tracing similar questions through distinct geographies, we highlight how they play out in different contexts acquiring different lives and meanings of their own. These stories can help us understand the ways and modes through which “governance” is produced, contested, and collapsed. Crucially, we highlight the “frictions” (Tsing, 2005), relations of power, and inequalities that characterize increasingly globalized governance practices in the region, with a focus on territories and people historically identified as “problematic”, or “ungovernable". Drawing on ethnographic, multi-sited, and actor-focused research, we investigate multi-scalar techniques and practices of governing territories and people in the MENA. Our interventions question the dynamics of managing life and governing people in four distinct political contexts: counterterrorism and aid securitization in Palestine, city-making and urban re/development in Beirut, the biopolitics of development and poverty in Morocco, and state-building projects predicated on warcraft and the un/making of state medicine in Iraq. Almost entirely aid dependent due to the protracted nature of conflict, Palestinians remain the largest per capita recipients of international development assistance in the world. Counterterrorism strategies shape the tone and tenor of aid provided to the Palestinians by Western states and much of the Arab World. Governed by the precepts of U.S. and international counterterrorism strategies, aid-economy actors seek to bolster factions supporting the peace process and undermine actors deemed detrimental to Israeli security. To the north of Israel/Palestine, postwar reconstruction and city-making through urban re/development in Lebanon gain impetus from a market logic that brands Beirut as a center of trade and investment, and places it on par with other global cities in the region. Hizbullah-led urban revitalization projects in Beirut's southern suburbs seek to project the embourgeoisement of the Shi'i community and its political achievements on to the built environment. These mega-projects are designed and implemented, in partnership with a complex nexus of actors and entities to reorganize, modernize and optimize urban space, manage life in the city, and consolidate the political and economic gains of a community historically labeled “problematic” and “underdeveloped". A similar litany of tropes resonates in Morocco where regions outside the area that stretches from Casablanca to Tangier and Fez are conceived of using the colonial-era nomenclature of “Maroc inutile”. In juxtaposition to “Maroc utile”, these regions have been historically disadvantaged and disproportionately subjected to the strong grip of Morocco's state security. Since the early-2000s, King Mohammed VI pursued liberalization policies and, faced with domestic demands for reform and international criticism regarding vast inequalities, initiated a national initiative for human development known by the French acronym INDH. Enabling the Kingdom to intervene in territories previously seen as “useless”, the INDH funded development projects realized with the help of an elaborate web of NGOs. Iraq under Ba'ath party rule was governed by fear and dictatorship. On the heels of decades of sanctions and destruction, the 2003 U.S.-led invasion led to commonplace characterizations of the country as “ungovernable” and a consistent description by analysts and academics of a country torn apart by occupation, violence and disorder. The history of Iraqi “fragility” dates to the British mandate and postcolonial state-building endeavors reliant upon state medicine and biopolitics. Medicinal discourses and the politics of health were key elements of post/colonial state-making, a political project contingent upon imaginations of an ungovernable Iraq. Our contributions tell different stories that demonstrate how “ungovernability” is integral and constitutive to the crafting and everyday workings of regimes of rule and power by revisiting the figure of the “ungovernable.” We develop this intervention in the form of four illustrative examples of our scholarship. In our sites of inquiry, actors involved in managing life and governing people do so by evoking “ungovernability” and identifying “ungovernable” populations. We do not understand “ungovernability” as a mere classification of an unruly and primitive Other, or as a representational form for alternate modalities of local symbolic orders. Instead, we highlight the importance of questioning “ungovernability” as a concept to expose the dialectic articulations of the dynamics and everyday workings of power and contribute to broader theoretical and conceptual debates. In the first contribution, Lisa Bhungalia considers the “racialized security anxieties” underpinning US aid to Palestine. She argues that development and humanitarian assistance are built upon the assumption that underdevelopment abroad poses a global security threat. Prevention, preemption, and risk management are constitutive elements of the security-counterterrorism nexus; the securitization of aid is premised on a racialized logic that inscribes threat and suspicion on the Muslim/Arab body and necessitates the management of “suspect lives” and “enemy landscapes”. Mona Atia interrogates the state's human development initiative as a fulcrum of development and security that turns “inutile” (useless) places and people into sites and subjects of intervention. She analyzes the politics of development and the metrics governing poverty in Morocco, arguing that the INDH is an attempt to civilize, modernize, and optimize lives and places previously abandoned by the state. Development integrates underdeveloped geographies and people into circuits of capital accumulation and shifts responsibility for development to civil society actors. Reliant on the King's claim to sovereignty, the INDH represents a transition away from a politics of neglect to a biopolitical and neoliberal security project invoking technologies of enumeration and calculability as vehicles for expropriation and dispossession. Fouad Gehad Marei argues that Hizbullah-led urban re/development projects render Beirut's southern suburbs a site of interventions to civilize, modernize, and optimize life. Predicated on notions of disorderliness and ungovernability, stigmatizations of Beirut's southern suburbs provide impetus for various forms of intervention from Israel's wrathful aerial bombardment to the politics of neglect characterizing much of the 1990s as well as Hezbollah's more contemporary urban interventions. Hizbullah-led urban mega-projects evoke “the community” and rely on national and international private-sector, civil-society and faith-based actors to consolidate the party's geopolitical project and control “populations” deemed to be a threat to its vision for an economy of order and discipline. In the fourth contribution, Omar Dewachi analyzes the nexus between biomedicine and power as integral to processes of statecraft in Iraq predicated on a litany of tropes constructing Iraq as “ungovernable.” Exploring the relationship between governance and life in its most literal and visceral sense, he chronicles the un/making of state medicine and state biopolitics in Iraq, and offers a framework for analyzing the aftermath of war as a biopolitical project. Drawing on the image of Iraq as inherently fragile and its population as ungovernable, he argues that the cultivation of medical infrastructure was central to Iraq's architectures of rule and governance. Our contributions trace ungovernability in relation to the politics of governing through terror, urbanity, poverty, and life, highlighting the techniques and modes of intervention this designation precipitates. These cases illustrate the real and mundane workings of governance and regimes of rule. When they challenge established maxims of governmentality research, such ethnographic findings are frequently reduced to a mere footnote to the works of those entitled to theorize. Our inquiries challenge the normative framing of “ungovernable” places and spaces as “anomalies”, at worst, and “aberrations”, at best, and insists that they are integral to broader projects of governance. While scholars are taken by concepts like governmentality, homo sacer and the precariat, we examine ungovernability as an idea, category and practice that travels from the laboratory of the MENA around the globe. Rather than examining “states of exception” as normalized, we stress that certain geographies and people are constructed as exceptional or in a “state of exception”, and that this designation is not a mere classification but an articulation of power. We show that these designations are integral to governing in that they invite intervention (e.g. warcraft, aid assistance, urban revitalization, development); thus, they enable cycles of violence and dispossession to be normalized. Moreover, designating geographies and people as exceptionally ungovernable allows those governing to elide the messiness of their work by describing that messiness as outside the domain of controllability and classifying it as an anomaly or a problematic aberration. We raise a series of provocations that posit “ungovernability” as an integral constitutive element of governing. Provocation 1: the classification of territories and people as “ungovernable” is, in itself, an instrument of domination and governance If “governance” is the management of territories and people, we ask who and what is governed, by whom, and to what effect (Foucault, 1991)? We identify where and how processes of governing take place; we interrogate the power relations latent in techniques and regimes of rule; and we probe the impact of globalization and the politics of intervention on these practices. Moreover, we ask how governments, non-governmental actors, private-sector entities, “experts” and citizens shape and partake in governing territories and people (Mitchell, 2002). Transformations in the MENA taking place under the rubric of globalization, neoliberalization and structural adjustments are not linear processes but arenas for political contestation. In turn, their outcomes are neither prescriptive, immutable, nor normative. Instead, governance “reforms” are contingent on local and historical configurations of power and their outcomes result in new and contested spaces, sites and subjectivities. Who determines “governables” and “ungovernables”; and how does “ungovernability” result in new technologies and discursive instruments? We argue that “ungovernability” provides an impetus for variegated forms of intervention that are designed, implemented and operationalized by state actors, intergovernmental organizations, donors agencies, development experts, and national and international military and police apparatuses. We demonstrate that governing, especially the “ungovernables”, takes on myriad forms including structural and regulatory reforms, biopolitical and micropolitical techniques, discursive and persuasive practices, as well as securitization and repression. Provocation 2: designating geographies and people as “ungovernable” (and, thus, exceptional) allows for the articulation and normalization of the exercise of power in ways that are otherwise exceptional. This exercise of power deploys new technologies of governance and a toolkit of instruments mobilized to govern the “ungovernable” We seek to “interrogate the different discourses and practices of governance that have imagined” particular geographies as ungovernable and “effectively made it so in swathes of scholarship” (Dewachi, 2017). “Ungovernability” discursively frames the disorderliness and messiness of governing as somehow outside of it. We assert that “ungovernability” enables shifting terrains of responsibilization to occur and power to be mystified by its wielders; thus, disguising “the fragilities and anxieties” of authority. Moreover, as a dialectic articulation of the dynamics and workings of power, evoking “ungovernability” provides impetus for forms of intervention and the cycles of violence and dispossession that are normalized in the name of security, development and population welfare. In realizing these interventions, “the community”, civil society and aid-economy actors are invited to assume responsibility as “partners”. Shifting terrains of responsibilization (Peck & Tickell, 2002) demand that subjects participate in their own development, democratization and empowerment. Responsibilization is achieved through reforms involving decentralization and participatory forms of governance and development (Bergh, 2013, Leitner et al., 2004, Miller and Rose, 2008). Promoted by Western governments, international financial institutions (IFIs), intergovernmental organizations and global civil society actors, these reforms evoke “the community” as a sector and involve multi-scalar schemes of cooperation between actors located on both sides of the North-South divide. The toolkit of instruments mobilized includes governing: 1) by denying “the governed” voice, mobility and agency; 2) through neglect, abandonment and despair; and 3) through technologies of the Self. Lisa Bhungalia's contribution highlights how the war on terror, through the distribution of aid, works as a disciplining and regulating mechanism. Omar Diwachi's contribution shows that sanctions and embargos imposed on Iraq in the aftermath of the second Gulf War and on Gaza following the 2006 election sought to control and govern “rogue” states and their populations. On the other hand, Fouad Gehad Marei and Mona Atia's contributions argue that, by rendering territories and people as “marginal”, “unruly”, and “inutile” and by confining them to the frontiers of state authority and economic prosperity, they are governed through a politic of neglect, abandonment and interventions designed to redress these “problems”. Through despair, “the governing” subjugate “the governed” to expanding and reconfigured regimes of rule characterized by the logics of informality and self-help among other things (Roy, 2009). In an era where discourses of accountability, transparency and empowerment are triumphant, technologies of enumeration and calculability discipline subjects not only into docile subjects but subjects that internalize their everyday struggles of survival as individual and collective failures of their kin. Thus, governing the Self (Dean, 2007, Rose, 1999) and one's community has taken on a moral dimension. Crucially, these practices of governing work in articulation with instruments of repression and biopolitics as authorities seek to regulate both the large-scale management of territories and people (the governed) and the micro-politics of everyday life (Lemke, 2011). Provocation 3: because of the innate disorderliness of governing “ungovernable” territories and people, it is instructive to map the myriad actors and scales at which “governing” happens and recognize the frictions and ruptures it produces. Methodologically, tracing “ungovernability” from the field and back to theorizations of governance reveals how the mundane and the exceptional are, in fact, co-constitutive The politics of governing the “ungovernable” de-centers the state, and requires it to morph into multiple guises and integrate into increasingly elaborate global networks. This reconfiguration produces new spaces of encounter and arenas of contestation, or “frictions” exacerbated by the expansion of “cooperations” and “partnerships” connecting the region with global powers. How then do the new forms and sites of governance shape the logics of action between actors, and what are the fissures and ruptures characterizing these reconfigured forms of governance? Methodologically, this calls for ethnographically unpacking “fragments of evidence” (Latour, 2005) to understand how practices, instruments and discourses travel independently and assume lives of their own. Embracing the proliferation of actors and decentralized power structures moves us beyond state/non-state designations and develops new ways of understanding emerging reconfigurations. Regimes of population management and governance are shaped by histories of post/colonial state-building, imperial interventions and war-making. Collectively, by insisting on the primacy of ethnographic methods to understanding regimes of rule, we highlight the importance and utility of “tracing” theoretical concepts from “the ground” and back to broader understandings of governance. While the scalar logics of our interventions are not novel to political geography and allied disciplines, few scholars achieve multi-scalar ethnographic embeddedness in the region. Theorizations “from above” are plentiful, and due, partly, to various barriers to researchers’ access (e.g. language, safety, research permissions, etc.). Our contributions demonstrate the importance of fieldwork-based ethnographic inquiries at these different scales and geographies, questioning not only the structures and actors involved but how we study them. This level of embeddedness allows us to: 1) comprehend the disorderliness and everyday workings of governance as it is experienced by the “ungovernables”; 2) account for the power of (and in) such discursive designations; and 3) understand how exceptional powers are deployed and exercised. Within the context of the “colonial present” (Gregory, 2004), the MENA serves as a “laboratory” for the crafting and testing of globalized forms of intervention. This context is a product of a layering of events and “moments” that mark the region as a hotbed of conflict and a site of intervention. Our contributions ethnographically demonstrate how the mundane and the exceptional are co-constitutive, highlighting the immense power enabled by labelling people and places as “ungovernable” and the exercise of power enabled by its deployment.

#### The impacts are resource wars, climate change, structural violence, and extinction — equitable governance structures are key

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In retrospect I wonder if I should have opened The Wrath of Capital with my closing remarks: ‘I close with the following proposition, which I mean in the most optimistic sense possible: our politics must start from the point that after 2050 it may all be over.’ ( Parr, 2013: 147). The emphasis here is on maybe. A future world of rising oceans, extreme weather events, species extinction, pollution, and increasing inequity is not inevitable. If the human race continues on its current course, then the earth could very well become an inhospitable place for a great many species, people included. To change course though, humanity needs to begin with a healthy dose of critical realism and an optimistic understanding of the political opportunities climate change presents. Using a neoliberal framework to craft solutions to climate change produces a vicious circle that reinstates the selfsame social organization and broader sociocultural and economic structures that have led to global climate change. The Wrath of Capital shows that climate change is not just an economic, cultural, or technological challenge. It is a political dilemma. Rigorous thinking and broadening our understanding of flourishing and emancipatory politics are important resources we can use to counter the narrow-minded view that the free market will solve the challenges climate change poses. The central focus of The Wrath of Capital is how ‘opportunity’ is put to work in climate change politics. Is it a moralizing or political operation? The conclusion I draw is that thus far the neoliberal framework of climate change politics has turned it into a moralizing discourse. For as I show the discourse exposes a racist, sexist, privileged political subject who points the finger of blame in the direction of underdeveloped countries overpopulating the earth, the Chinese polluting the atmosphere, ‘primitive societies’ in need of ‘modernizing’ their economies and governments, and an inefficient and ineffectual public sphere that should hand the ownership and management of common pool resources over to the private sector. All are moralizing arguments presented under the umbrella of climate change solutions. It is therefore important we recognize these are not political arguments. Arguments of this kind do not view the ‘opportunity’ in question as a platform for transforming otherwise oppressive, exploitative, and coercive power relations. To briefly restate the argument I develop. I start with a now well known and oft cited fact that the scientific consensus is human activities are changing global climate. If this situation continues predictions for the future of all life on earth are far from good, and by some accounts these are quite simply catastrophic. Obviously we need to change course but the lingering question is how to do this? Unsurprisingly, given the prevailing economic and political influence neoliberalism currently has, solutions to the question of what to do about climate change have used a neoliberal point of reference. The principles of the free market, privatization, individualism, consumerism, and competition all shape the current direction of climate change politics. In the book I describe how the logic of the free market has resulted in a new brand of capitalism – climate capitalism – that has led to the creation of a market in pollution (cap and trade, or emissions trading) which has placed the limits climate change poses for capitalism back in the service of capital accumulation. Vast tracts of land have accordingly been turned into green energy farms (solar panels or wind farms), which in theory is a fabulous idea, but when practiced unchecked leads to land grabbing. Another form of land appropriation taking place under the guise of climate change solutions is the greening of cities. Green urbanism, as it is commonly called, refers to modifying cities so as to make them more environmentally friendly. This involves the creation of bike paths, green roofs, public transportation, green spaces, pedestrian friendly cities, efficient land use policies, and energy efficient buildings; all fabulous initiatives that potentially could improve the lives of all city dwellers. I show how green urbanism trumps equitable urbanism. Green urbanism in Chicago has also been used to justify demolishing public housing in a city where land values are growing and the poor are turned out on to the rental market with vouchers in hand designed to offset the higher rental costs. David Harvey fittingly calls this ‘accumulation by dispossession’, when public wealth is privatized and the poor are displaced (Harvey, 2003). The global population is expected to peak at just over 9 billion people in 2050. The argument is that more people will place the ecological balance of life on earth under serious strain, and along with more people comes more greenhouse gas emissions. Focusing on population numbers means that the population debate, as it figures within climate change political discourse, fails to acknowledge qualitative differences. For instance, not everyone impacts the climate equally. Not everyone has a dangerously high ecological footprint. The more well to do citizens of the world produce the greatest ecological burdens. Similarly the fear over China’s growing national emissions typically points to a growing Chinese middle class of eager consumers. However, comparing national greenhouse gas emissions does not honestly represent national emissions. One can easily be fooled into thinking China poses the greatest threat to achieving a global reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. However, if we consider how much dirty manufacturing high-income nations outsource to China then we come to realize that high-income nations are in large part responsible for China’s growing emissions. In addition, there are serious theoretical shortcomings to how per capita emissions statistics figure within climate change discourse. Rates of consumption rely upon the individual subject being the primary unit of analysis, at the expense of analyses that produce a nuanced examination of how different collective scenarios, such as household size and whether a person is an urban or rural dweller, also impact patterns of consumption. More importantly the per capita analysis of reproduction does not account for how inequity works within the larger discourse of reproductive rights. I ask: ‘Are the poor women from low-and middle-income countries having fewer babies so that the affluent can continue to consume a steady line of cheap commodities that are made by the cheap labor of these selfsame women?’ (Parr, 2013: 50). I use the example of women working at the plastic-recycling center in the Dharavi slum in Mumbai to explain that women being ‘liberated’ from the reproductive role traditionally assigned to them does not necessarily lead to emancipation. Indeed the women I met were working around the clock in filthy conditions with no workers rights returning to a tiny shack and a long list of domestic chores that had them working well into the night and rising before the sun came up. In this context the population debate fails to tackle the feminist problem of how women’s bodies are coded, and the location of female bodies in a matrix of power that is oppressive and exploitative. Tangentially related to the population debate is the growing concern over the diminishing quality and quantity of potable water. For example, the United Nations ‘predicts that by 2025 two out of three people will be living in conditions of water stress, and 1.8 billion people will be living in regions of absolute water scarcity’ (Parr, 2013: 53). If we also consider how climate change is changing the hydrologic cycle it is unsurprising that competition over water resources is mounting. This situation has spurred on a burgeoning water market, resulting in the privatization of water resources and unlikely marriages between the public and private sector to form. Water scarcity, when combined with extreme weather events and changing seasonal patterns also impacts food production. The solution to this has been the widespread industrialization of food production which I explain has led to a growing market in patenting indigenous ecological knowledge, seeds, and the violent exploitation of animal reproductive systems and immigrant labor. Using the logic of neoliberalism to ‘solve’ the crisis climate change poses is not a solution it is a displacement activity. And as the final chapter argues, this displacement activity is an act of violence that conceals a deeper structural violence, or what Zizek would call the ‘objective violence’, of global capitalism (Zizek, 2010) such that the political weight of the problem is no longer felt. Critically engaging with this structure of objective violence is a necessary first step in creating emancipatory solutions and engaging new political subjectivities. Some reviewers have disputed the book for lacking concrete solutions (Stoekl, 2013 and Pearse, 2014). Others regard my conclusions as pessimistic (Cuomo and Schueneman, 2013: 699), stating the message I leave a reader with is one of general futility (Miller, 2013: 1). I understand the criticism but I would disagree adding that I tackle the nihilistic condition of climate change politics describing how it empties the political promise of futurity out of climate change discourse. What is nihilistic, in my view, is presenting a neoliberal worldview as a universal instead of appreciating it is merely a construction and as such it is refutable. Recognizing this, describing how it works, and understanding its contingent character is for me a political strategy. Allan Stoekl asks ‘If we are to do away with consumerist individualism’ then, ‘what, in practice, will replace it?’ (Stoekl, 2013: 4). I am coming at this issue from a slightly different vantage point. Instead of hoping to eliminate consumerist individualism, I am more interested in the machinic problem of how consumerist individualism works. This point is indebted to Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis of desire as social. As I see it, we need to first recognize that individualism as expressed through consumption is just one kind of investment human energies and affects can take. This point is at the core of my analysis of sustainability culture in Hijacking Sustainability ( Parr, 2009). The observation has concrete political consequences for it means energies and affects can be re-directed away from individual consumption and find investment in more emancipatory outcomes. Consumerist individualism is therefore not inevitable; it can be countered, but only if we first grasp how it works. Stoekl goes on to inquire what kind of government, ‘elected by whom, and with what (and whose) money’ could successfully realize a sustainable project (Stoekl, 2013: 4). His query echoes a similar question raised by Rebecca Pearse who writes, ‘How to turn a sense of humanity’s complicity with violence of capital into political practice is less clear.’ (Pearse, 2014: 133). Likewise Ryder W. Miller recognizes the book’s call to ‘carry on’, yet without presenting ‘many new options or ideas’ (Miller (2013): 1). I do outline an alternative approach to governance, recognizing that often this issue is presented as having either a vertical orientation (State or corporate governance) or one that is constituted as a horizontal mass movement (grassroots organization, local initiatives). I suggest a more collaborative and equitable governance structure might emerge from a transversal operation, whereby the horizontal and vertical dialectically engage each other. Whilst I acknowledge the importance of presenting concrete solutions that governments, people, and entrepreneurs can implement, the point I make is that if politics remains at the level of neoliberal outcomes this presumes solutions to the problems climate change poses are properly the province of capital accumulation. In my view, this is not a solution it is an act of bad faith. Under such circumstances climate change politics is neutralized and is even reduced to a mere banality, because it is stripped of its transformative potential. Solving the climate change puzzle cannot be achieved under the rubric of neoliberalism because this occurs at the expense of an emancipatory project. Life will never be sustainable if the structural violence of capital accumulation continues unchecked. This distinction is ultimately an intellectual problem concerning understanding. What I set out to do is expand the reader’s understanding of how neoliberalism has become the standard against which all social, economic, cultural, and political responses to climate change are measured. Solutions are constructions and currently these primarily take place within a neoliberal frame. In my view this is lazy thinking and it has produced a narrow, even ignorant view of what opportunity consists of. The opportunity climate change presents is primarily valued as an instrument of privatization, individualism, consumption, commodification, and capital accumulation. The Wrath of Capital critiques this kind of reductive thinking explaining it arises when the practices of climate change politics are disaggregated from gender, racism, class relations, speciesism, and sexuality. If we widen the lens of climate change analysis to include the forces of exploitation, oppression, and inequity then we allow deeper ontological problems to surface. Thinking about these issues within the context of climate change discourse is a political strategy because it shifts the priorities away from capital accumulation and onto advancing the social good. All in all The Wrath of Capital identifies the myriad ways in which climate change politics has gained traction, however, I go on to consider how the logic of neoliberalism infects the potential political opportunity climate change presents. As neoliberalism enters the arenas of climate change discourse, policy, debate, and solutions – economic growth, population growth, food and water scarcity, spectacle – the transformative political opportunity is hollowed out. So yes, I do end with a desperate plea announcing all roads currently lead us through the gates of capitalist heaven. However, this is only true if our politics ignores the emancipatory promise of political change and continues on its current neoliberal trajectory. Under this schema the opportunity in question merely constructs passive subjectivities that are circumscribed by the inevitability of a neoliberal future. I maintain this is only inevitable as long as the neoliberal inscription of all spaces for all times remain closed to critique.

#### The alternative is to affirm the dual power model of the Communist Party – only the Party can provide effective accountability mechanisms to correct unproductive tendencies, educate and mobilize marginalized communities, and connect local struggles to a movement for international liberation

Escalante 18 (Alyson Escalante is a Marxist-Leninist, Materialist Feminist and Anti-Imperialist activist. “PARTY ORGANIZING IN THE 21ST CENTURY” September 21st, 2018 <https://theforgenews.org/2018/09/21/party-organizing-in-the-21st-century/>)

I would argue that within the base building movement, there is a move towards party organizing, but this trend has not always been explicitly theorized or forwarded within the movement. My goal in this essay is to argue that base building and dual power strategy can be best forwarded through party organizing, and that party organizing can allow this emerging movement to solidify into a powerful revolutionary socialist tendency in the United States. One of the crucial insights of the base building movement is that the current state of the left in the United States is one in which revolution is not currently possible. There exists very little popular support for socialist politics. A century of anticommunist propaganda has been extremely effective in convincing even the most oppressed and marginalized that communism has nothing to offer them. The base building emphasis on dual power responds directly to this insight. By building institutions which can meet people’s needs, we are able to concretely demonstrate that communists can offer the oppressed relief from the horrific conditions of capitalism. Base building strategy recognizes that actually doing the work to serve the people does infinitely more to create a socialist base of popular support than electing democratic socialist candidates or holding endless political education classes can ever hope to do. Dual power is about proving that we have something to offer the oppressed. The question, of course, remains: once we have built a base of popular support, what do we do next? If it turns out that establishing socialist institutions to meet people’s needs does in fact create sympathy towards the cause of communism, how can we mobilize that base? Put simply: in order to mobilize the base which base builders hope to create, we need to have already done the work of building a communist party. It is not enough to simply meet peoples needs. Rather, we must build the institutions of dual power in the name of communism. We must refuse covert front organizing and instead have a public face as a communist party. When we build tenants unions, serve the people programs, and other dual power projects, we must make it clear that we are organizing as communists, unified around a party, and are not content simply with establishing endless dual power organizations. We must be clear that our strategy is revolutionary and in order to make this clear we must adopt party organizing. By “party organizing” I mean an organizational strategy which adopts the party model. Such organizing focuses on building a party whose membership is formally unified around a party line determined by democratic centralist decision making. The party model creates internal methods for holding party members accountable, unifying party member action around democratically determined goals, and for educating party members in communist theory and praxis. A communist organization utilizing the party model works to build dual power institutions while simultaneously educating the communities they hope to serve. Organizations which adopt the party model focus on propagandizing around the need for revolutionary socialism. They function as the forefront of political organizing, empowering local communities to theorize their liberation through communist theory while organizing communities to literally fight for their liberation. A party is not simply a group of individuals doing work together, but is a formal organization unified in its fight against capitalism. Party organizing has much to offer the base building movement. By working in a unified party, base builders can ensure that local struggles are tied to and informed by a unified national and international strategy. While the most horrific manifestations of capitalism take on particular and unique form at the local level, we need to remember that our struggle is against a material base which functions not only at the national but at the international level. The formal structures provided by a democratic centralist party model allow individual locals to have a voice in open debate, but also allow for a unified strategy to emerge from democratic consensus. Furthermore, party organizing allows for local organizations and individual organizers to be held accountable for their actions. It allows criticism to function not as one independent group criticizing another independent group, but rather as comrades with a formal organizational unity working together to sharpen each others strategies and to help correct chauvinist ideas and actions. In the context of the socialist movement within the United States, such accountability is crucial. As a movement which operates within a settler colonial society, imperialist and colonial ideal frequently infect leftist organizing. Creating formal unity and party procedure for dealing with and correcting these ideas allows us to address these consistent problems within American socialist organizing. Having a formal party which unifies the various dual power projects being undertaken at the local level also allows for base builders to not simply meet peoples needs, but to pull them into the membership of the party as organizers themselves. The party model creates a means for sustained growth to occur by unifying organizers in a manner that allows for skills, strategies, and ideas to be shared with newer organizers. It also allows community members who have been served by dual power projects to take an active role in organizing by becoming party members and participating in the continued growth of base building strategy. It ensures that there are formal processes for educating communities in communist theory and praxis, and also enables them to act and organize in accordance with their own local conditions. We also must recognize that the current state of the base building movement precludes the possibility of such a national unified party in the present moment. Since base building strategy is being undertaken in a number of already established organizations, it is not likely that base builders would abandon these organizations in favor of founding a unified party. Additionally, it would not be strategic to immediately undertake such complete unification because it would mean abandoning the organizational contexts in which concrete gains are already being made and in which growth is currently occurring. What is important for base builders to focus on in the current moment is building dual power on a local level alongside building a national movement. This means aspiring towards the possibility of a unified party, while pursuing continued local growth. The movement within the Marxist Center network towards some form of unification is positive step in the right direction. The independent party emphasis within the Refoundation caucus should also be recognized as a positive approach. It is important for base builders to continue to explore the possibility of unification, and to maintain unification through a party model as a long term goal. In the meantime, individual base building organizations ought to adopt party models for their local organizing. Local organizations ought to be building dual power alongside recruitment into their organizations, education of community members in communist theory and praxis, and the establishment of armed and militant party cadres capable of defending dual power institutions from state terror. Dual power institutions must be unified openly and transparently around these organizations in order for them to operate as more than “red charities.” Serving the people means meeting their material needs while also educating and propagandizing. It means radicalizing, recruiting, and organizing. The party model remains the most useful method for achieving these ends. The use of the party model by local organizations allows base builders to gain popular support, and most importantly, to mobilize their base of popular support towards revolutionary ends, not simply towards the construction of a parallel economy which exists as an end in and of itself. It is my hope that we will see future unification of the various local base building organizations into a national party, but in the meantime we must push for party organizing at the local level. If local organizations adopt party organizing, it ought to become clear that a unified national party will have to be the long term goal of the base building movement. Many of the already existing organizations within the base building movement already operate according to these principles. I do not mean to suggest otherwise. Rather, my hope is to suggest that we ought to be explicit about the need for party organizing and emphasize the relationship between dual power and the party model. Doing so will make it clear that the base building movement is not pursuing a cooperative economy alongside capitalism, but is pursuing a revolutionary socialist strategy capable of fighting capitalism. The long term details of base building and dual power organizing will arise organically in response to the conditions the movement finds itself operating within. I hope that I have put forward a useful contribution to the discussion about base building organizing, and have demonstrated the need for party organizing in order to ensure that the base building tendency maintains a revolutionary orientation. The finer details of revolutionary strategy will be worked out over time and are not a good subject for public discussion. I strongly believe party organizing offers the best path for ensuring that such strategy will succeed. My goal here is not to dictate the only possible path forward but to open a conversation about how the base building movement will organize as it transitions from a loose network of individual organizations into a unified socialist tendency. These discussions and debates will be crucial to ensuring that this rapidly growing movement can succeed.

#### The aff’s politics cede the universal in favor of local, fragmented knowledge – this surrenders the ability to define the future to neoliberal hegemony – the universal is not inherently-oppressive, but it will be under unfettered capitalism

**Hester 17**  
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There has been an excess of modesty in the feminist agendas of recent decades. Carol A. Stabile is amongst those who have been critical of an absence of systemic thinking within postmodern feminisms, remarking upon a “growing emphasis on fragmentations and single-issue politics.”1 Stabile dismisses this kind of thinking which, in “so resolutely avoiding ‘totalizing’—the bête noire of contemporary critical theory—[…] ignores or jettisons a structural analysis of capitalism.”2 The difference in scope and scale between that which is being opposed and the strategies being used to oppose it is generative of a sense of disempowerment. On the one hand, Stabile argues, postmodern social theorists “accept the systemic nature of capitalism, as made visible in its consolidation of power and its global expansion […] Capitalism’s power as a system is therefore identified and named as a totality”; on the other hand, these theorists “celebrate local, fragmented, or partial forms of knowledge

**[Marked]**

 as the only forms of knowledge available” and criticize big-picture speculative thinking for its potentially oppressive tendencies or applications.3 Nancy Fraser, too, has addressed this apparent “shrinking of emancipatory vision at the fin de siècle,” linking this with “a major shift in the feminist imaginary” during the 1980s and 1990s—that is, with a move away from attempting to remake political economy (redistribution) and towards an effort at transforming culture (recognition).4 The legacies of this kind of political theorizing—legacies some might describe as “folk political”—are still being felt today, and continue to shape the perceived horizons of possibility for progressive projects.5 Yet these projects, which are frequently valuable, necessary, and effective on their own terms, are not sufficient as ends in themselves. To the extent that they are conceptualized in detachment from an ecology of other interventions, operating via a diversity of means and across a variety of scales, they cannot serve as a suitable basis for any politics seeking to contest the imaginaries of the right or to contend with the expansive hegemonic project of neoliberal capitalism. It is for this reason that Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams’s work positions itself as somewhat skeptical about fragmentations and single-issue politics, pointing out that problems such as “global exploitation, planetary climate change, rising surplus populations, [and] the repeated crises of capitalism are abstract in appearance, complex in structure, and non-localized.”6 As such, a politics based around the ideas that “the local is ethical, simpler is better, the organic is healthy, permanence is oppressive, and progress is over” is not always the best weapon in an attempt to contend with the complex technomaterial conditions of the world as it stands.7 There is a persistent kind of abstraction anxiety hanging over progressive politics; an anxiety that haunts a contemporary leftist feminism still unwilling or unable to critically reappraise the tendencies that Stabile identified in the 90s. Recently, however, a renewed appetite for ambitious and future-oriented emancipatory politics has begun to make itself felt at the fringes of the left—and indeed, to gather momentum and popular support more broadly.8 Perhaps the most remarkable example of this tendency within philosophically-inflected political theory circles has been accelerationism, with its calls to build an “intellectual infrastructure” capable of “creating a new ideology, economic and social models, and a vision of the good to replace and surpass the emaciated ideals that rule our world today.”9 These so-called “Promethean” ideas have generated widespread interest, arguably both reflecting and contributing to the changing tenor of activist discourse. Interestingly, this term has to some extent emerged in opposition to the pejorative “folk political,” acting as a shorthand for a very different set of values and perspectives. In a recent critical piece, Alexander Galloway suggests that “Prometheanism” could be defined as “technology for humans to overcome natural limit.”10 Peter Wolfendale, meanwhile, sees it as a “politics of intervention”—one that starts from the insistence that nothing be exempted in advance from the enactment of re/visionary processes.11

## 1NC — Case

### 1NC — AT: Stanley

#### State engagement is not inherently anti-queer, and the neg maintains queer abjection

Powers, Prof @ Roehampton University, 9

(Nina, “Non-Reproductive Futurism,” borderlands, vol.8 No.2, <http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol8no2_2009/power_futurism.pdf>)

Edelman’s desire to conflate all politics with reproductive futurism does an injustice to the politics behind some of the historical shifts in the way abortion, for example, has been conceived. Even in the examples Edelman himself gives of anti-reproductive movements, he is quick to state that these campaigns for abortion rights frame the argument in terms of a ‘fight for our future – for our daughters and sons’ (Edelman, 2004: 3). But, whilst it is true that the anti-abortion debate (especially in America) is often played out on the territory of the right (where the rhetoric of pro-life reigns), it is certainly not the case in other parts of the world that abortion is defended in the name of those children already born, i.e. trapped in the framework of reproductive futurity. Elsewhere, it is the rationality of the woman, her ability to make economic and pragmatic decisions that feature foremost in any debate about the rights and wrongs of abortion. Historically, too, discussions about abortion took place in broader contexts that stressed abortion alongside questions of the equal right to work, progressive notions of family structure and so on. Before Stalin repealed the laws, the Soviet Union under Lenin was the first to provide free and on demand abortions. These laws were couched not in terms of ‘life,’ but in terms of pragmatism predicated on a notion of political equality. As Wendy Z. Goldman puts it: Soviet theorists held that the transition to capitalism had transformed the family by undermining its social and economic functions. Under socialism, it would wither away and under communism, it would cease to exist entirely. (Goldman, 1993: 11) Unless the family is considered in its social and economic function, it makes no sense to speak of its power as an image, however powerful this image might be. Edelman ultimately concedes far too much to a very narrow ideological image of the family that, whilst pernicious, is easier to undo with reference to history and practice than he seems to think. As Tim Dean puts it: ‘the polemical ire that permeates No Future seems to have been appropriated wholesale from the rightwing rants to which he recommends we hearken’ (Dean, 2008: 126). In the first section I tried to identify some of the contradictions between the contemporary family and the demands of capitalism, while above I gave examples of politics not based on reproduction and reproduction not based on futurity: what follows from this is that there are important historical shifts in the way in which the family and the image of the child comes to shift in and out of focus. Take the discussions surrounding in vitro fertilisation. First viable as a reproductive practice in the late 1970s, early artificial insemination was regarded as a ‘paganistic and atheistic’ practice (Barrett and McIntosh, 1982: 11). Now, however, despite the wastage of potential viable embryos in the process, it is generally regarded as a practical option for infertile couples. Here the contradictions of contemporary social feeling towards children is exposed once again: reproductive futurism turns out not to be invested in all children, but only those it chooses to keep out of a pragmatism enabled by technology. Edelman talks about the ‘morbidity inherent in fetishization as such’ when opponents of abortion use photos of foetuses to highlight the proximity of the foetus to the ‘fully-formed child’ (Edelman, 2004: 41). He is right that morbidity and the politics of life seem to go hand-inhand, but then proceeds to argue that it is the queer alone that has a duty to remain true to this morbidity, to expose the ‘misrecognised’ investments of ‘sentimental futurism’: The subject … must accept its sinthome, its particular pathway to jouissance … This, I suggest, is the ethical burden to which queerness must accede in a social order intent on misrecognising its own investment in morbidity, fetishisation, and repetition: to inhabit the place of meaninglessness associated with the sinthome; to figure an unregenerate, and unregenerating, sexuality whose singular insistence on jouissance, rejecting every constraint imposed by sentimental futurism, exposes aesthetic culture – the culture of forms and their reproduction, the culture of Imaginary forms – as always already a “culture of death” intent on abjecting the force of a death drive that shatters the tomb we call life. (Edelman, 2004: 47-8) This does not exactly seem like a revelation. We live for the most part in pragmatic acceptance of this culture of death. It hardly shocks us when, for example, statistics reveal that, in 2004, 60% of women who had abortions had already given birth to at least one child (Sharples, 2008). Those people most identified with children – mothers – turn out, quite often, to deal with ‘life’ rather more pragmatically than we might otherwise believe. Edelman has to ignore historical and current examples of abortion rights campaigns, and other attitudes towards the family, in order to shoehorn all politics into a single vision to which he then opposes his notion of the queer. As Brenkman puts it: ‘To grant the Right the status of exemplary articulators of “the” social order strikes me as politically self-destructive and theoretically just plain wrong’ (Brenkman, 2002: 177). There are genuine moments of historical and political importance in terms of thinking about the family that seem to escape Edelman’s dismissal of politics as inevitably futural. We do not need to give up on politics altogether, whilst still accepting that the image of the child is a massive ideological obstacle. Rancière’s notion of political equality (‘Politics … is that activity which turns on equality as its principle’ (Rancière, 1999: ix)) neither concedes ground to politics as it appears (the ordering of the state, the police, a supposed consensus) nor does it think that politics is impossible or nondesirable, as Edelman does. We must ask: is all politics conservative by definition? Does negativity or resistance to existing power structures always translate back into some stable and positive form? The examples of the kibbutzim and the various contradictions in the ideology and practices of contemporary reproduction make it clear that Edelman, whilst having a strong argument about the shape that the ideology of the child takes, has to ignore the unstable compromises that the contemporary world has already made with itself regarding life and death in reproduction. Alan Sinfield has questioned whether we should really conflate all political aspirations with Edelman’s conception of reproductive futurism: ‘perhaps reproductive futurism is capturing and abusing other political aspirations and they should be reasserted’ (Sinfield, 2005: 50). It is not, then, that all politics is reproductively futural, but that this image has come to pervert other political desires, which may have a more complex relationship to children and a progressive conception of humanity. Edelman polemically dismisses the ‘left’ attitude to the queer, as ‘nothing more than a sexual practice in need of demystification’ (Edelman, 2004: 28). Whilst a certain strain of leftist thinking does pursue this demystificatory line (arguing, for example, that many forms of sexual expression are ‘natural’), Edelman reduces the left position on sexuality to a simple question of acceptance, as a way of arguing that the queer can mean nothing to the left. But there are, as indicated above, quite different ways of thinking about the family (in a non-futural, non-ideological way) and about politics, and the two together. When Rancière discusses the ‘subject of politics’, he makes it clear that: The subject of politics can precisely be identified neither with “humanity” and the gatherings of a population, nor with the identities defined by constitutional texts. They are always defined by an interval between identities, be these identities determined by social relations or juridical categories. (Rancière, 2006a: 59) Could this ‘interval between identities’ be the jouissance that Edelman aligns with the queer? Whilst Edelman’s psychoanalytic subject could in no way be understood as a similar (non)entity to Rancière’s ‘subject of politics,’ this idea of the interval seems to indicate a site of noncapture that could be described in a certain sense as ‘queer.’ In Edelman’s response to John Brenkman he states that: ‘Sexuality refuses demystification as society refuses queerness’ (Edelman, 2002: 181-5). By reifying sexuality as something that ‘refuses’ meaning, Edelman oddly substantialises it; Rancière’s way out of the identities determined by social relations or juridical categories is much less dependent on any pre-existing identity, even though he retains the very concept of politics that Edelman rejects. There seems to be no reason why the subject of politics for Rancière couldn’t be a ‘queer’ subject in Edelman’s sense, at the same time as reclaiming a notion of rationality away from the categories of the state. Before turning to a brief summary of this tentative queer rationalism, one more structural element of Edelman’s argument will be addressed: that of the death drive.

#### The critique is reductionist and results in violence against queer bodies

Levi & Shay 12 — Jennifer Levi (faculty of Western New England University School of Law, the director of the Transgender Rights Project of GLAD (Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders), participated in successful efforts to pass transgender-inclusive antidiscrimination laws throughout New England); Giovanna Shay (faculty of Western New England University School of Law, co-chair of the Corrections Committee of the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section, participated in institutional change litigation involving prisons, as well as efforts to enforce the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) and amend the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)), “The dangers of reform” , Source: The Women's Review of Books. 29.4 (July-August 2012): p30. Info Trac database

In his recent book, Normal Life, Dean Spade, a law professor at Seattle University School of Law and noted transgender activist, criticizes several law-reform movements, including those to improve prison conditions, win marriage equality for same-sex couples, and ensure that hate crimes and antidiscrimination laws include transgender people. Spade finds fault with LGBTQ rights organizations' efforts to win mainstream acceptance, arguing that instead of pursuing an equality agenda, they should focus on changing "the distribution of life chances," by "demand[ing] radical redistribution of wealth and an end to poverty." Spade's critique has the most force in the context in which it originated--calling for an end to what David Garland first described as mass incarceration, the system many refer to as the "prison industrial complex." It is less persuasive when applied to the realm of free-world LGBTQ rights. Spade's perspective is shaped by the prison-abolitionist movement, as well as, he says, by critical race theory and "woman of color feminism." In 2002, Spade founded the Sylvia Rivera Law Project (SRLP), which provides free legal services to transgender and gender nonconforming people, and whose mission, according to its website (slrp.org/about), is "to guarantee that all people are free to self-determine their gender identity and expression, regardless of income or race, and without facing harassment, discrimination, or violence." Normal Life is rooted in this experience, and fits comfortably within a series of recent prison-abolitionist works focusing on the experiences of queer and transgender people, including Queer (In)Justice: The Criminalization of LGBT People in the United States (2010), and Captive Genders: Trans Embodiment and the Prison Industrial Complex (2011), a collection of essays to which Spade contributed. Spade writes that his purpose in Normal Life is to describe a "critical trans politics ... that demands more than legal recognition and inclusion." Arguing that equality of life chances, or distributive justice, cannot be achieved through law reform alone, he calls for a broader agenda: "prison abolition, the elimination of poverty, access to full health care, and an end to immigration enforcement." These goals, he submits, "cannot be conceptualized or won within the realm of US law." Citing the work of critical race theorist Alan Freeman, Spade questions the focus of antidiscrimination law on violations of individual rights, which, he argues, tends to obscure more systemic and structural kinds of disadvantage. Instead of pursuing a rights-based law reform strategy, Spade writes, the trans movement should focus on "population-level operations of power," such as ending mass incarceration. The models he recommends for pursuing "transformative change" will resonate with those familiar with the work of organizers such as "rebellious lawyering" proponent Gerry Lopez, Brazilian educational reformer Paolo Freire, or civil rights campaigner Ella Baker: "[M]eaningful change," Spade says, "comes from below," and "those most directly impacted" should lead the fight. Normal Life's leftist critique of liberal reform has deep roots in the history of US social movements. For example, in his book Stories of Scottsboro, James Goodman describes how, in 1931, during the trial of the Scottsboro Boys (nine African American teenagers falsely accused of raping two white women), leaders of the International Labor Defense (ILD) organization attacked the NAACP as "an instrument of the white capitalist class for the perpetuation of the slavery of the negro people." ILD members marched with signs equating "lynchers, reformers, and enemies of the Negro people." Then as now, leftists viewed the racialized criminal-punishment system as a tool of broader economic oppression. Spade writes that advocates seeking to remedy prison conditions should beware of inadvertently strengthening the prison system. He explains: We must avoid proposals that include constructing buildings or facilities to house trans prisoners, to hire new staff, or make any other changes that would expand the budget and/or imprisoning capacities of the punishment system. He goes on to say, "[W]e must ensure that legal work is always aimed at dismantling the prison industrial complex ... [k]nowing that the system is likely to try to co-opt our critiques to produce opportunities for expansion." This is essentially the criticism of prison reform leveled by Angela Y. Davis in her 2003 book, Are Prisons Obsolete? She argues that, despite the good intentions of advocates, prison reform can produce more prisons--new and sanitized versions built to reduce overcrowding. Davis warns that discussions of prison reform focus "almost inevitably on generating the changes that will produce a better prison system." Although some reforms may be significant, she writes, "frameworks that rely exclusively on reforms help to produce the stultifying idea that nothing lies beyond prison." It is not only prison abolitionists who share Spade's concern about the unintended consequences of prison reform. The sociologist Heather Schoenfeld writes that prison-conditions litigation in Florida contributed to a prison building boom there. Other commentators--including James Jacobs, Malcolm Feeley, and Van Swearingen--argue that prisoners' rights litigation contributed to the "bureaucratization" of prisons, consolidating administrators' power even as it asserted prisoners' rights. Examples of double-edged US criminal-punishment reforms extend well beyond prison conditions. As described by Kate Stith and Steve Y. Koh (in "The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines," Wake Forest Law Review, 1993), some of the initial proponents of federal sentencing guidelines were liberal academics and judges, who wanted to rationalize sentencing to make it fairer and more consistent. Unfortunately, as innumerable commentators have recounted, the implementation of the guidelines produced draconian sentences, ultimately contributing to the growth of US prisons. In adopting an all-or-nothing approach, however, Spade fails to acknowledge ways in which the liberal prisoners' rights movement has helped to advance critical trans politics. At a minimum, prison-reform litigation generated information, through civil discovery, that advocates used to draw attention to prison conditions. Access to prisoners has been facilitated by the minimal legal protections and professional norms that the prisoners' rights movement helped to achieve. Rather than undermining the radical project that Spade promotes, liberal law-reform efforts arguably laid foundations for the prison-abolitionist movement. As for hate crimes prohibitions, Spade writes that they "strengthen and legitimize the criminal punishment system," which targets poor people of color and singles out poor trans people of color for particular harassment. "Changing what the law explicitly says about a group," he points out, "does not necessarily remedy the structured insecurity faced by that group." We ourselves are agnostic on the question of hate crimes penalties for crimes against LGBTQ people: the exclusion of sexual orientation and gender identity from existing laws not only minimizes the seriousness of anti-LGBTQ violence but also nearly guarantees a dearth of law enforcement resources. Nevertheless, we are also acutely aware of the danger of expanding the already massive criminal-punishment system in any way. In the context of mass incarceration, in which reform can produce ever cleaner and more technologically advanced human warehouses, Spade's arguments are well-taken. His critique is less persuasive when he moves into the broader arena of LGBTQ rights. Spade believes that law reform is at odds with distributive justice. In his view, advocacy that departs from the idealized approach he champions harms the transgender community. While we laud his critique of some elements of liberal law reform, we disagree with his zero-sum frame. Law reform is only one piece of a strategy. It cannot achieve everything, but it is sometimes a necessary precondition to reaching other goals and, at a minimum, is not a causative element for diminished opportunities and status. A transgender equality movement that includes expansion of antidiscrimination laws and marriage equality among its goals is coextensive with the project of "transformative change." Spade argues that antidiscrimination laws "create the false impression that ... fairness has been imposed, and the legitimacy of the distribution of life chances restored." But such protections merely ensure that a person's sexual orientation or gender identity cannot be an obvious basis for an adverse employment action. They are nowhere near broad enough to promise substantive equality, for transgender people or anyone else. However, excluding gender identity and sexual orientation from existing employment protections is far more damaging than committing the resources for the advocacy required to expand them. In addition, organizing to pass antidiscrimination laws has activated and radicalized LGBTQ advocacy organizations. The California-based Transgender Law Center (incubated by the National Center for Lesbian Rights) and the Massachusetts Transgender Political Coalition (first envisioned by GLAD staff members and interns) are two examples of the generativity of liberal law reform efforts. Both organizations share many of the distributive justice goals of SRLP. Spade is not the first to criticize the movement for marriage equality for same-sex couples. In "Arguing Against Arguing for Marriage" (University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 2010), Shannon Gilreath claims that "marriage is dangerous for Gays conceptually, in its patriarchal and heteropatriarchical foundations." In less absolute terms, Katherine Franke writes in the New York Times (June 23, 2011) that same-sex marriage is a "mixed blessing," which may undermine other arrangements that LGBTQ people have used to "order our lives in ways that have given us greater freedom than can be found in the one-size-fits-all rules of marriage." Spade goes too far in applying the same critique to both prison reform and marriage equality. Removing gender discrimination from the institution of marriage does not strengthen it in the way that modifying the criminal-punishment system reinforces mass incarceration. The institution of marriage has an evolving social meaning. Extending it to lesbians, gay men, bisexual and transgender people reaffirms our human dignity. Even the most steadfast critics of the marriage-equality movement--including the lesbian activists and law professors Nancy Polikoff and the late Paula Ettelbrick--have acknowledged that critiques of marriage and the marriage equality movement need not be on a collision course. In addition, Spade ignores law-reform efforts spearheaded by LGBTQ legal organizations other than those focused on hate crimes, anti-discrimination, and marriage. These include challenges to discriminatory health care access and to prison regulations that deny essential medical care to transgender inmates; immigration reform advocacy; and support for transgender students and homeless LGBTQ youth. To ignore these efforts is to miss the ocean for the tidal pool beside it.

### 1NC — Politics

#### Revolutionary queer demands undermine nuanced analysis of actual, localized resistances to homophobia. We must engage in the state

McGhee 13 — Derek McGhee, Professor of Sociology at the University of Southampton, 2013 (“Conclusion: Accommodation Trouble, Queer Legal Theory and Politics,” *Homosexuality, Law and Resistance*, Published by Routledge Press, ISBN: 0415249023, pgs. 171-172)

In contrast to this, Duggan delimits her target and devises a strategy that bypasses this stereotypical!)' queer 'relational politics of identity'. She does this in order to engage effectively with what she sees as being central to the devaluing and differential treatment of non-heterosexualities within contemporary America, that is, the state's complicity with heteronormativity. The primary difference between the approach demonstrated in Homosexuality, Law and Resistance and the other queer approaches discussed above, is that my approach can be described as less subversive and less motivated by the hope of a society-wide transformation. The over-emphasis on 'utopian' revolutionary subversion in queer studies might be to the detriment of localised, nuanced analysis of actual episodes of effective resistance. The proffering of transformational, Utopian solutions is an 'early' queer practice, that has been bypassed by 'late' queer discursive-sociological approaches which attempt to blend a queer politics of knowledge with localised and contextualized institutional analysis of social practices. The case studies included in this book incorporate and fuse the analysis of discourse with the tracing and teasing-out of the complex blends and effects that resistances to legal exclusion or restriction encounter within each institutional setting. These are textual analyses that break through the text, where discourse and episodes of resistance are given equal emphasis. Moreover, instead of subversion and transformation, these case studies focus on specific examples of local particular resistances that are motivated more by 'survival' than subversion, even though trouble does come with the territory.

#### The state can be used to address heteronormativity.

Chambers and Carver 8 — Samuel A. Chambers is Senior Lecturer in Politics at Swansea University, and Terrell Carver is Professor of Political Theory at the University of Bristol, UK, 2008 (“Part III: The Politics of Heteronormativity,” *Judith Butler and Political Theory: Troubling Politics*, Published by Routledge Press, ISBN: 0-203-93744-9, pg. 156-157

Finally, heteronormativity can also be subverted at the level of public policy. The trend in recent years, particularly in the US, has been to make heteronormativity more explicit by writing it into the law, where it previously was not mentioned (and for potentially subversive countertrends, see Carver 2007). The Federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and the dozens of state DOMAs all serve to codify the presumption of heteronormativity by announcing it plainly. In one sense, this is a dramatic setback in the struggle for equal civil rights for lesbian and gay citizens – a fact that should not be downplayed. Nevertheless, in the politics of norms the very effort required to defend heteronormativity outwardly suggests a certain weakening of the norm. And legislators across the US have made it clear that they see themselves as responding to an imminent threat. This threat is certainly not, as those legislators would have it, against the 'sacred institution of marriage', but it may well be a threat to heteronormativity, to the easy presumption of heterosexuality. Perhaps the legalisation of gay marriage will prove subversive on this front, if and when it happens. Perhaps it will not (Warner 1999). However, and in any event, from within the theory of subversion that we have articulated here, the most subversive move of all would come, on the level of national public policy, in simply eliminating state-sactioned marriage altogether.

#### Queer theory fails — it provides no solution to improve real living conditions for queer individuals. Voting aff doesn’t actually create abolition only engaging with the government can.

Kirsch 2k — Max Kirsch, Associate Professor of Anthropology at Florida Atlantic University, 2000 (“Roles and Subversions: Professing Parody,”*Queer Theory and Social Change*, PPublished by Routledge Press, ISBN: 0415221854, p. 97-98)

Queerness as a deviant form of heterosexuality results in oppression. When this fact is not confronted, it can lead to maladaptive responses that include the markings of internalized homophobia: depression, psychosis, resignation, and apathy. These are very much reactions to the ways in which we view ourselves, which in turn are, at least in part, due to the ways in which we are constantly told to view ourselves. Here, the production of consciousness takes a very concrete form. Those enduring this form of violence cannot, even in the academy, simply decide to disengage. We cannot simply refuse to acknowledge these facts of social life in our present society, and hope that our circumstances will change. Although the lack of definition is what has inspired the use of "queer," it cannot, as Butler herself asserts, "overcome its constituent history of injury" (1993b: 223). Be that as it may, "queer," as put forward by Queer theorists, has no inherent historical or social context. We continually return to the following question: to whom does it belong and what does it represent? These advocates of "queer" do not acknowledge that *queer* is produced by social relations, and therefore contains the attributes of existing social relations. As I have shown, Queer theory, particularly as it is expressed in Butler's writings on performativity, dichotomizes the political as personal and the political as social action into a binary that positions political action in impossible terms. The nature of the "political" is never clearly discussed, and remains a chasm (cf. Kaufman and Martin, 1994). However appealing the notion of positioning the self through a reinterpretation of the "I" may be, it is misguided as political action: it cannot generate the collective energy and organization necessary to challenge existing structures of power. As Michael Aglietta observes, "There is no magical road where the most abstract concepts magically command the movement of society" (1979: 43). The question of polities, then, brings us back to where we began: what is the nature of the political and how do we address it? Is it beneficial to maintain alliances with established political parties? Can we adopt the dominant values of our culture and still hope to change the dynamics of those values? How do we form alliances with other oppressed groups? Is there a structural economic basis for such an alliance, or should we look elsewhere? Perhaps most importantly: is it possible, given the tremendous resources represented by the dominant and coercive ideology of our present social relations, to maintain the energy necessary to develop and continue modes of resistance that counter it? In the last question, as I will show, lies an answer to the issue of alliances and structural identification. But first, we need to refocus the discussion.

### 1NC — Debate

#### Debate should be a site for role experimentation. Their radical refusal of state engagement precludes the micro-political fissure-making necessary to challenge the logic of capital and create political change.

Yee 15—futurist, business strategist and freelance writer (Aubrey, “The Fragility of Things and Capacities of the Micro-Political Experiment”, Theory & Event Volume 18, Issue 3, 2015, dml)

To escape the crocodile death roll of modernity thus requires the calm serenity of fluid movement paired with the speed of instinct and reaction. Such instinctual reaction in the face of certain death can only be born of militant and repetitive practice until the reaction is finally, purely instinctual. Like the surfer who survives a wipe-out on a 100’ wave, the calm that allows your body to go limp and ride out the excruciating minutes of chaotic tumbling and lack of air can only come from a thoroughly practiced and steady mind. Finding joy and purpose in political practice becomes critical to the longevity and intensity of commitment. In words frequently attributed to him, Gary Sirota explains why he surfs: “There are no more committed people on the planet than surfers. We fall down a lot. We turn around, paddle back out, and do it over and over again.”9 In this same way, we must become addicted to the high of engagement. The accumulation of political role experimentations espoused by Connolly become a path for amplifying connection and perception and as each experiment makes a small difference, the natural amplification of effects “may prepare us to participate with others in yet more adventurous activities” that counteract the insistent amplification of neoliberal ideological forces.10 In this prescription, as we learn to surf the ceaseless waves of climate change, species loss, socio-economic inequality, refugees, war, surveillance and depression, we find the moments of joy and connection in the work that keep us coming back, each time more prepared and capable of surfing bigger waves with confidence.

To begin cultivating the necessary qualities, Connolly’s imagination of the ‘micro’ is instrumental. He argues that, “Capitalism writ large… sets too large and generic a target…The point today is not to wait for a revolution that overthrows the whole system.”11 To reinforce this hypothesis, Connolly connects his vision of a vigilant micro-political commitment to our daily entanglement with the microbiota within and all around us, “because human and nonhuman systems regularly infuse and impinge upon one another – both at the microscopic level within human bodies and at the macroscopic level between disparate systems.”12 We can see this phenomena manifested clearly with the increasing prevalence of Toxoplasma gondii, an intracellular parasitic protozoan typically found in cat poo and implicated in a whole host of disorders perhaps most notably and symbolically schizophrenia.13 Or in the way that a newborn child is robbed of their very first protective microbial force field when birthed by caesarean, a trend reaching upwards of 40 percent in some countries like Chile.14 These and myriad other micro-biological processes remind us daily that “We are not unique; we are merely distinctive.”15 Embracing that level of humility is crucial as we are forced to evolve rapidly and transformatively in a not-so-distant future filled with environmental wierding, socio-economic upheavals and chaotic technological advances all underwritten by a neoliberal world order. Humility, in this post-normal world becomes an invaluable asset, allowing us to productively accept, understand and enhance our positively parasitic partnership with unseen micro-realities rather than becoming mired in the ego-ic experience of neoliberal individualism. Community is today more critical, and in fact more endangered, than it has ever been. The realities that a parasite could induce delusions of grandeur in the human mind, and that commodification of health has led to children entering the world devoid of their first microbial allies are significant for our understandings of modern neoliberal politics. “Capitalist modes of acceleration, expansion, and intensification that heighten the fragility of things today also generate pressures to minoritize the world along multiple dimensions at a more rapid pace that heretofore.”16 Reversing this neoliberal tendency to loosen beings from their connection to the web of existence is the work of our time. Rebuilding our ability to sense connection and resonance when it occurs, to hear our na’au when it speaks to us in new languages, these are our challenges and our calling.

Connolly mirrors and re-resonates this value for micro-processes in his evaluation of political will. By positioning role performance as political experiment, Connolly subtly argues for the microbial infection and amplification of day-to-day activity, indicating that small deliberate choices can lead to entrenched behaviors much in the same way that ingestion of the toxoplasma microbe can eventually lead to schizophrenia. He clearly argues that “role experimentations and the shape of the pluralist assemblage thus infect one another.”17 To ignore the tacit role performances with which we engage constantly is to then succumb to the habitual nature of practices that “condense previous relations of overt power.”18 Instead, we are being asked by the inherent fragility of things to intentionally foster micro-political-performances that enhance our militant democratic possibilities. Coincidentally these same performances will likely be the ones that inspire the most joy within us; a joy that creates a space for us to persist and practice despite a mounting understanding of catastrophe. Whether it is a small group of scholars gathering to discuss the fragility of things, or a blog one of us writes later to critique neoliberal ideologies, or a smile given to a stranger in a crowded public space, or a garden, planted in an abandoned city lot to grow food and feed a neighborhood, these microscopic daily acts of political will reaffirm that “there is no zone of complete neutrality in a world of role performances” and that there are “significant relays between role performance, self-identity, and the formation of larger political constellations.”19 In the same way that we are constantly made and re-made by the microbial biological realities at work within our bodies, our politics are constantly made and re-made by the micro-political choices and identifications we collectively propagate.

And yet, despite this insistence on micro-political performativity, there is an equally urgent call to reengage with the state as a site of activism. Treading lightly in his prescriptions, Connolly is nonetheless explicit in his concern for the mounting pressures to discard the state altogether. Instead, he explains that, “the fragile ecology of late capital requires state interventions of several sorts. A refusal to participate in the state today cedes too much hegemony to neoliberal markets.”20 The scale of the challenges we face and their planetary ubiquity require state intervention as much as they require the resonance of community based micro-politics. We need a revolution at all scales to reverse the trends that have brought us a world where small island nations are being swallowed by a rising ocean; a world where many say the sixth extinction is already underway; a world where most Americans have little or no connection to most of their closest neighbors. The severity and ubiquity of the crisis demands an equal amount of amplification and resonance from the other side of the pendulum and this will only come if we engage “a multisited politics designed to infuse a new ethos into the fabric of everyday life.”21

The political economy of late-late capitalism is a moving assemblage – its loose joints and disparate edges tearing at the fragile fabric of communities in the midst of their struggle to hold a center. And we must become painfully aware, if we have not already, that in this day and age, the very notion of community and the heterogeneity that deeply place-based community cultivates is under heated attack from many sides. This is the fate of our neoliberal embrace, for as Connolly suggests, “neoliberalism is a form of biopolitics that seeks to produce a nation of regular individuals, even as its proponents often act as if they are merely describing processes that are automatic and individual behavior that is free.”22 This is perhaps the ultimate deception of the Anthropocene epoch and a delusion that could very well be our undoing. Participation in this delusion is partially a survival instinct, “since total immersion in the dangers of the future and the contemporary condition can lead you to neglect daily duties and needs.”23 These realities coalesce to form an ever-greater argument for the capacity of micro-processes as change agents. Harnessing the “potential power of these subterranean flows” will allow us the fortitude to continue persisting in a world entrenched in neoliberal schizophrenia while simultaneously building the capacity for self-organization and feedback loops that allow “a self-amplification system to emerge”, what Connolly calls a “creative resonance machine” – one to counter and unbalance the machine that is literally consuming the planet and all its natural resources.24 This resonance machine would have micro-political communities forming in various places around the world which would then find connections among one another to build ever-greater alliances that en masse have the potential to enact Connolly’s vision of the militant politics that are necessary to “defeat neoliberalism, to curtail climate change, to reduce inequality, and to instill a vibrant pluralist spirituality into democratic machines that have lost too much of their vitality.”25 In the short term at least, it seems that we still very much need the institutions of the state as final safe guards against the pervasive and divisive individuality that neoliberalism would have us believe is paramount to freedom.

It is then within this call to role performance as political experiment that I believe Connolly offers us a compelling way forward. Imagining our daily micro political maneuvers as part of a larger resonance machine embroiled in the best that a complex universe has to offer is the only way we may find the fortitude to relax our breath, conserve the last bits of oxygen we have left and ride the chaos of this massive wave until the set has passed and we find our way to the sky for a quick and critical breath. Remembering with calm confidence that another set of waves with equally chaotic power is very likely on its way. At our constant aid is the innate human appreciation for aesthetic experience. We may want to seriously consider the idea that aesthetics are in fact a basic and physiological form of communicating ethics between modes of existence such as living/non-living or human/non-human. Joseph Campbell called this ‘the problem of beauty,’ and in an interview with Bill Moyers he asked, “When a spider makes a beautiful web, the beauty comes out of the spider’s nature. It’s instinctive beauty. How much of the beauty of our own lives is about the beauty of being alive?”26 Re-instilling our ethical imaginary with this positioning allows for incorporation of both humility and reverence, two concepts critical to the task of managing our fragility. Cultivating our sensitivity to the inherent aesthetic communication of non-human beings and things requires specific courage in a world full of apparent suffering, but I believe that this courage is crucial and we can no longer afford to deny our complicity in the state of things as they are.

Where I disagree with Connolly is primarily in his assessment of thinking about and envisioning the future(s). Arguing for dedication to an ‘interim agenda,’ Connolly suggests that “in a world of becoming the more distant future is too cloudy to engage.”27 While this may be true on face value, the cloudiness of the more distant future must not preclude our engagement with it. Instead, at this point in history it is more crucial than ever to hone our capacity for engaging with uncertainty and becoming comfortable in the fog. It is through the repeated and consistent practice of imagining and envisioning preferred and alternative futures that we will polish and strengthen our capacity for performing militant and productive micro-politics in the present. The future is destined to be the artifact of those with the most militant imaginings and we cannot afford to forego that commitment for a focus solely on the interim present. Getting good at experiment is part of this process. In fact ethical experiment and resilience may be the words best suited to replace the outdated and misused meme of sustainability. Micropolitical experiment like microbial contagion will shape and reshape our path as we charge forward into an increasingly chaotic future in a “cosmos of becoming.”28

### 1NC — Turn

#### Anti-government movements and tactics get shut down

Fredrik **deBoer 16**, Limited-Term Lecturer, Introductory Composition at Purdue Program, 3/15/16, “c’mon, guys,” <http://fredrikdeboer.com/2016/03/15/cmon-guys/>

I could be wrong about the short-term dangers, and the stakes are incredibly high. But in the end we’re left with the same old question: what tactics will **actually work to secure a better world?** In a sharp, sober piece about the meaning of left-wing political violence in the 1970s, Tim Barker writes “If you can’t acknowledge radical violence, radicals are reduced to mere victims of repression, rather than political actors who made definite tactical choices under given political circumstances.” **The problem**, as Barker goes on to imply, is those tactical choices: in today’s America they will essentially **never break on the side of armed opposition against the state**. The government knows everything about you, I’m sorry to say, your movements and your associations and the books you read and the things you buy and what you’re saying to the people you communicate with. That’s simply on the level of information, before we even get to the state’s incredible capacity to inflict violence. Look, **the world has changed**. The relative military capacity of regular people compared to establishment governments has changed, especially in fully developed, technology-enabled countries like the United States. The Czar had his armies, yes, but the Czar’s armies depended on manpower above and beyond everything else. The fighting was still mostly different groups of people with rifles shooting at each other. If tomorrow you could rally as many people as the Bolsheviks had at their revolutionary peak, you’re still left **in a world of F-15s, drones, and cluster bombs**. And that’s to say nothing of the fact that establishment governments in the developed world can rely on the **numbing agents of capitalist luxuries** and the American dream to damper revolutionary enthusiasm even among the many millions who have been marginalized and impoverished. **This just isn’t 1950s Cuba**, guys. **It’s just not**. In a very real way, modern technology effectively lowers the odds of armed political revolution in a country like the United States **to zero**, and so much the worse for us. **This isn’t fatalism**. It doesn’t mean there’s no hope. It means that there is **little alternative to organization**, to changing minds through **committed political action** and using the available nonviolent means to create change: a concert of grassroots organizing, labor tactics, and **partisan politics**. Those things aren’t exactly likely to work, either, but they’re a **hell of a lot more plausible than us dweebs taking the Pentagon**. Bernie Sanders isn’t really a socialist, but he’s a social democrat that moves the conversation to the left, and if people are **dedicated and committed to organizing**, the local, state, and national candidates he inspires will **move it further to the left still**. You got any better suggestions? Listen, commie nerds. My people. I love you guys. I really do. And I want to build a better world. **Not incrementally, either**, but with the kind of **sweeping and transformative change** that is required to fix a world of such deep injustice. But **seriously**: none of us are ever going to take to the barricades. And it’s a good thing, too, because we’d probably find a way to shoot in the wrong direction. I can’t dribble a basketball without falling down. American socialism is largely made up of bookish dreamers. I love those people but they’re not for fighting. And even if you have a particular talent for combat, you’re looking at fighting the combined forces of Google, Goldman Sachs, and the defense industry. Violence is hard. Soldiering is hard. In an era of the NSA and military robots, it’s really, really hard. **“Should we condone revolutionary violence?” is dorm room, pass-the-bong conversation fodder**, of **precisely the moral and intellectual weight** of “should we torture a guy if we know there’s a bomb and we know he knows where it is and we know we can stop it if we do?” It’s built on **absurd hypotheticals**, propped up by the power of anxious machismo, and undertaken to **no practical political end**. It’s understandable. I get it, I really do. But it’s got nothing to do with us. The only way forward is the **grubby, unsexy work of building coalitions** and asking people to climb on board

# 2NC

## K — Cap

#### Absent vertical participation, the aff is useless — governments obey institutional logics that exist independently of individuals and constrain decision-making

Wight, IR prof, 6 – Professor of IR @ University of Sydney (Colin, “Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology”, pgs. 48-50)

One important aspect of this relational ontology is that these relations constitute our identity as social actors. According to this relational model of societies, one is what one is, by virtue of the relations within which one is embedded. A worker is only a worker by virtue of his/her relationship to his/her employer and vice versa. ‘Our social being is constituted by relations and our social acts presuppose them.’ At any particular moment in time an individual may be implicated in all manner of relations, each exerting its own peculiar causal effects. This ‘lattice-work’ of relations constitutes the structure of particular societies and endures despite changes in the individuals occupying them. Thus, the relations, the structures, are ontologically distinct from the individuals who enter into them. At a minimum, the social sciences are concerned with two distinct, although mutually interdependent, strata. There is an ontological difference between people and structures: ‘people are not relations, societies are not conscious agents’. Any attempt to explain one in terms of the other should be rejected. If there is an ontological difference between society and people, however, we need to elaborate on the relationship between them. Bhaskar argues that we need a system of mediating concepts, encompassing both aspects of the duality of praxis into which active subjects must fit in order to reproduce it: that is, a system of concepts designating the ‘point of contact’ between human agency and social structures. This is known as a ‘positioned practice’ system. In many respects, the idea of ‘positioned practice’ is very similar to Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of *habitus*. Bourdieu is primarily concerned with what individuals do in their daily lives. He is keen to refute the idea that social activity can be understood solely in terms of individual decision-making, or as determined by surpa-individual objective structures. Bourdieu’s notion of the *habitus* can be viewed as a bridge-building exercise across the explanatory gap between two extremes. Importantly, the notion of a habitus can only be understood in relation to the concept of a ‘social field’. According to Bourdieu, a social field is ‘a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions objectively defined’. A social field, then, refers to a structured system of social positions occupied by individuals and/or institutions – the nature of which defines the situation for their occupants. This is a social field whose form is constituted in terms of the relations which define it as a field of a certain type. A *habitus* (positioned practices) is a mediating link between individuals’ subjective worlds and the socio-cultural world into which they are born and which they share with others. The power of the habitus derives from the thoughtlessness of habit and habituation, rather than consciously learned rules. The habitus is imprinted and encoded in a socializing process that commences during early childhood. It is zinculcated more by experience than by explicit teaching. Socially competent performances are produced as a matter of routine, without explicit reference to a body of codified knowledge, and without the actors necessarily knowing what they are doing (in the sense of being able adequately to explain what they are doing). As such, the *habitus* can be seen as the site of ‘internalization of reality and the externalization of internality.’ Thus social practices are produced in, and by, the encounter between: (1) the *habitus* and its dispositions; (2) the constraints and demands of the socio-cultural field to which the habitus is appropriate or within; and (3) the dispositions of the individual agents located within both the socio-cultural field and the *habitus*. When placed within Bhaskar’s stratified complex social ontology the model we have is as depicted in Figure 1. The explanation of practices will require all three levels. Society, as field of relations, exists prior to, and is independent of, individual and collective understandings at any particular moment in time; that is, social action requires the conditions for action. Likewise, given that behavior is seemingly recurrent, patterned, ordered, institutionalised, and displays a degree of stability over time, there must be sets of relations and rules that govern it. Contrary to individualist theory, these relations, rules and roles are not dependent upon either knowledge of them by particular individuals, or the existence of actions by particular individuals; that is, their explanation cannot be reduced to consciousness or to the attributes of individuals. These emergent social forms must possess emergent powers. This leads on to arguments for the reality of society based on a causal criterion. Society, as opposed to the individuals that constitute it, is, as Foucault has put it, ‘a complex and independent reality that has its own laws and mechanisms of reaction, its regulations as well as its possibility of disturbance. This new reality is society…It becomes necessary to reflect upon it, upon its specific characteristics, its constants and its variables’.

#### 2 — the affirmative cedes the political in favor of local knowledge — i.e. Stanley’s and 1AC CX’s example of Miss Major’s local protest against the state — ceding the political surrenders to neoliberal hegemonic future by not attempting to use the state against itself — that’s Hester which I’ll finish now [sorry for the bad formatting I took it from Gmail]

**1NC Hester 17**  
(Helen Hester is Associate Professor of Media and Communication at the University of West London. Her research interests include technofeminism, sexuality studies, and theories of social reproduction. She is a member of the international feminist collective Laboria Cuboniks. “Promethean Labors and Domestic Realism” 25 September 2017 <http://www.e-flux.com/architecture/artificial-labor/140680/promethean-labors-and-domestic-realism/> rvs)

There has been an excess of modesty in the feminist agendas of recent decades. Carol A. Stabile is amongst those who have been critical of an absence of systemic thinking within postmodern feminisms, remarking upon a “growing emphasis on fragmentations and single-issue politics.”1 Stabile dismisses this kind of thinking which, in “so resolutely avoiding ‘totalizing’—the bête noire of contemporary critical theory—[…] ignores or jettisons a structural analysis of capitalism.”2 The difference in scope and scale between that which is being opposed and the strategies being used to oppose it is generative of a sense of disempowerment. On the one hand, Stabile argues, postmodern social theorists “accept the systemic nature of capitalism, as made visible in its consolidation of power and its global expansion […] Capitalism’s power as a system is therefore identified and named as a totality”; on the other hand, these theorists “celebrate local, fragmented, or partial forms of knowledge

**[Marked here in the 1NC]**

 as the only forms of knowledge available” and criticize big-picture speculative thinking for its potentially oppressive tendencies or applications.3 Nancy Fraser, too, has addressed this apparent “shrinking of emancipatory vision at the fin de siècle,” linking this with “a major shift in the feminist imaginary” during the 1980s and 1990s—that is, with a move away from attempting to remake political economy (redistribution) and towards an effort at transforming culture (recognition).4 The legacies of this kind of political theorizing—legacies some might describe as “folk political”—are still being felt today, and continue to shape the perceived horizons of possibility for progressive projects.5 Yet these projects, which are frequently valuable, necessary, and effective on their own terms, are not sufficient as ends in themselves. To the extent that they are conceptualized in detachment from an ecology of other interventions, operating via a diversity of means and across a variety of scales, they cannot serve as a suitable basis for any politics seeking to contest the imaginaries of the right or to contend with the expansive hegemonic project of neoliberal capitalism. It is for this reason that Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams’s work positions itself as somewhat skeptical about fragmentations and single-issue politics, pointing out that problems such as “global exploitation, planetary climate change, rising surplus populations, [and] the repeated crises of capitalism are abstract in appearance, complex in structure, and non-localized.”6 As such, a politics based around the ideas that “the local is ethical, simpler is better, the organic is healthy, permanence is oppressive, and progress is over” is not always the best weapon in an attempt to contend with the complex technomaterial conditions of the world as it stands.7 There is a persistent kind of abstraction anxiety hanging over progressive politics; an anxiety that haunts a contemporary leftist feminism still unwilling or unable to critically reappraise the tendencies that Stabile identified in the 90s. Recently, however, a renewed appetite for ambitious and future-oriented emancipatory politics has begun to make itself felt at the fringes of the left—and indeed, to gather momentum and popular support more broadly.8 Perhaps the most remarkable example of this tendency within philosophically-inflected political theory circles has been accelerationism, with its calls to build an “intellectual infrastructure” capable of “creating a new ideology, economic and social models, and a vision of the good to replace and surpass the emaciated ideals that rule our world today.”9 These so-called “Promethean” ideas have generated widespread interest, arguably both reflecting and contributing to the changing tenor of activist discourse. Interestingly, this term has to some extent emerged in opposition to the pejorative “folk political,” acting as a shorthand for a very different set of values and perspectives. In a recent critical piece, Alexander Galloway suggests that “Prometheanism” could be defined as “technology for humans to overcome natural limit.”10 Peter Wolfendale, meanwhile, sees it as a “politics of intervention”—one that starts from the insistence that nothing be exempted in advance from the enactment of re/visionary processes.11

#### The aff’s depiction of the state as a locus of violence and power feeds right-wing condemnation of the government and ensures the perpetuation of neoliberal violence

Parenti, Sociology PhD, 15 (Christian Parenti, former visiting fellow at CUNY's Center for Place, Culture and Politics, as well as a Soros Senior Justice Fellow, teaches in the Liberal Studies program at New York University, interview with Vincent Emanuele, writer, activist and radio journalist who lives and works in the Rust Belt, “Climate Change, Militarism, Neoliberalism and the State,” May 17, 2015, http://ouleft.sp-mesolite.tilted.net/?p=1980)

You mention mutual aid and how it was overhyped by the left in the aftermath of Katrina. I’m thinking of the same thing in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy. You’ve been critical of the left in the US for not approaching and using the state apparatus when dealing with climate change and other ecological issues. Can you talk about your critique of the US left and why you think the state can, and should, be used in a positive manner?¶ Just to be clear, I think it is absolutely heroic and noble what activists have done. My critique is not of peoples’ actions, or of people; it’s of a lack of sophistication, and I hold myself partly accountable, as part of the US left, for our deficiencies. With Hurricane Sandy, the Occupy folks did some amazing stuff. Yet, at a certain level, their actions became charity. People were talking about how many meals they distributed. That’s charity. That is, in many ways, a neoliberal solution. That’s exactly what the capitalist system in the US would like: US citizens not demanding their government redistribute wealth from the 1% to the 99%. The capitalists love to see people turn to each other for money and aid. Unwittingly, that’s what the anarcho-liberal left fell into.¶ This is partly due a very American style of anti-state rhetoric that transcends left and right. The state is not just prisons or the military. It’s also Head Start, quality public education, the library, clean water, the EPA, the City University of New York system – a superb, affordable set of schools that turns out top-notch, working-class students with the lowest debt burdens in the country. There’s a reason the right is attacking these institutions. Why does the right hate the EPA and public education? Because they don’t want to pay to educate the working class, and they don’t want the working class educated. They don’t want to pay to clean up industry, and that’s what the EPA forces them to do. When the left embraces anarcho-liberal notions of self-help and fantasies of being outside of both government and the market, it cuts itself off from important democratic resources. The state should be seen as an arena of class struggle.¶ When the left turns its back on the social democratic features of government, stops making demands of the state, and fails to reshape government by using the government for progressive ends, it risks playing into the hands of the right. The central message of the American right is that government is bad and must be limited. This message is used to justify austerity. However, in most cases, neoliberal austerity does not actually involve a reduction of government. Typically, restructuring in the name of austerity is really just a transformation of government, not a reduction of it.¶ Over the last 35 years, the state has been profoundly transformed, but it has not been reduced. The size of the government in the economy has not gone down. The state has become less redistributive, more punitive. Instead of a robust program of government-subsidized and public housing, we have the prison system. Instead of well-funded public hospitals, we have profiteering private hospitals funded by enormous amounts of public money. Instead of large numbers of well-paid public workers, we have large budgets for private firms that now subcontract tasks formerly conducted by the government.¶ We need to defend the progressive work of government, which, for me, means immediately defending public education. To be clear, I do not mean merely vote or ask nicely, I mean movements should attack government and government officials, target them with protests, make their lives impossible until they comply. This was done very well with the FCC. And my hat goes off to the activists who saved the internet for us. The left should be thinking about the ways in which it can leverage government.¶ The utility of government was very apparent in Vermont during the aftermath of Hurricane Irene. The rains from that storm destroyed or damaged over a hundred bridges, many miles of road and rail, and swept away houses. Thirteen towns were totally stranded. There was a lot of incredible mutual aid; people just started clearing debris and helping each other out. But within all this, town government was a crucial connective tissue.¶ Due to the tradition of New England town meeting, people are quite involved with their local government. Anarchists should love town meetings. It is no coincidence that Murray Bookchin spent much of his life in Vermont. Town meetings are a form of participatory budgeting without the lefty rigmarole. More importantly, the state government managed to get a huge amount of support from the federal government. The state in turn pushed this down to the town level. Without that federal aid, Vermont would still be in ruins. Vermont is not a big enough political entity to shake down General Electric, a huge employer in Vermont. The Vermont government can’t pressure GE to pay for the rebuilding of local infrastructure, but the federal government can.¶ Vermont would still be a disaster if it didn’t get a transfer of funds and materials from the federal government. Similarly in New York City, the public sector does not get enough praise for the many things it did well after super storm Sandy. Huge parts of the subway system were flooded, yet it was all up and running within the month.¶ As an aside, one of the dirty little secrets about the Vermont economy is that it’s heavily tied-up with the military industrial complex. People think Vermont is all about farming and boutique food processing. Vermont has a pretty diverse economy, but agriculture plays a much smaller role than you might think, about 2 percent of employment. Meanwhile, the state’s industrial sector, along with the government, is one of the top employers, at about 13 percent of all employment. Most of this work is in what’s called precision manufacturing, making stuff like: high performance nozzles, switches, calibrators, and stuff like the lenses used in satellites, or handcrafting the blades that go in GE jet engines. But I digress … As we enter the crisis of climate change, it’s important to be aware of the actually existing legal and institutional mechanisms with which we can contain and control capital.¶ I often joke with my anarchist and libertarian friends and ask if their mutual-aid collectives can run Chicago’s sanitation system or operate satellites. Of course, on one level, I’m joking, but on another level, I’m being quite serious. I don’t think activists on the left properly understand the complexity of modern society. A simple example would be how much sewage is produced in a single day in a country with 330 million people. How do people expect to manage these day-to-day issues? In your opinion, is there a lack of sophistication on the left in terms of what, exactly, the state does and how it functions in our day-to-day lives?¶ It’s sobering to reflect on just how complex the physical systems of modern society are. And though it is very unpopular to say among most American activists, it is important to think about the hierarchies and bureaucracies that are necessarily part of technologically complex systems. A friend of mine is a water engineer in Detroit, and he was talking to me about exactly what you’re mentioning. The sewer system in Detroit is mind-bogglingly enormous and also very dilapidated and very expensive. To not have infrastructure publicly maintained, even though the capitalist class might not admit this, would ultimately undermine capital accumulation.¶ You asked if there is a lack of sophistication. Look, I’m trying to make helpful criticisms to my comrades on the left, particularly to activists who work so hard and valiantly. I’ve criticized divestment as a strategy, yet I support it. I criticized the false claims that divesting fossil fuels stocks would hurt fossil fuel companies. The fossil fuel divestment movement started out making that claim. To its credit, the movement has stopped making such claims. Now, they say that it will remove the industries "social license," which is a problematic concept that comes from the odious world of "corporate social responsibility." However, now, students are becoming politicized, and that’s always great news.¶ For several years, some of us have been trying to get climate activists, the climate left, to take the EPA and the Clean Air Act seriously. The EPA has the power to actually de-carbonize the economy. The divestment logic is: Schools will divest, then fossil fuel companies will be held in greater contempt than they are now? Honestly, they’re already hated by everybody. That does what? That creates the political pressure to stop polluting? We already have those regulations: the Clean Air Act. There was a Supreme Court Case, Massachusetts v. EPA, that was ruled on in 2007. It said the EPA must regulate greenhouse gas emissions. Lots of professional activists in the climate movement, at least up until very recently, have been totally unaware of this.¶ Consequently, they are not making demands of the EPA. They are not making demands of their various local, state and federal environmental agencies. These entities should be enforcing the laws. They have the power. It’s not because the people in the climate movement are bad people or unintelligent. They’re dedicated and extremely smart. It’s because there’s an anti-state ethos within the environmental movement and a romanticization of the local. On a side note, I don’t think all of this stuff about local economies is helpful. Sometimes I think this sort of thinking doesn’t recognize how the global political economy works. The comrades at Jacobin magazine have called this anarcho-liberalism. I think that is a great way to describe the dominant ideology of US left, which is both anarchist and liberal in its sensibilities. This ideology is fundamentally about ignoring government, and instead, being obsessed with scale, size, and, by extension, authenticity. Big things are bad. Small things are good. Planning is bad. Spontaneity is good. It is as insidious as it is ridiculous. But it is the dominant worldview among the US left.¶ Do you really think that this is the best way to approach the industry, through mobilizing state resources?¶ Look, the fossil fuel industry is the most powerful force the world has ever seen. Be honest, what institution could possibly ~~stand up to~~ rebuff them? The state. That doesn’t mean it will. Right now, government is captured by these corporate entities. But, it has, at least in theory, an obligation to the people. And it also has the laws that we need to wipe out the fossil fuel industrial complex. This sounds fantastical and nuts, but I don’t think it is. I’ve been harping on this in articles and a little bit at the end of Tropic of Chaos. According to the Center for Biological Diversity, Nixon-era laws can be used to sue developers, polluters, etc. You might not be able to stop them, but you can slow them down. The Clean Air Act basically says that if science can show that smoke-stack pollution is harmful to human health, it has to be regulated.¶ If there was a movement really pushing the government, and making the argument that the only safe level of CO2 emissions is essentially zero … We have the laws in place. We have the enabling legislation to shut down the fossil fuel industry. We should use the government to levy astronomical fines on the fossil fuel companies for pollution. And we should impose them at such a level that it would undermine their ability to remain competitive and profitable.¶ Part Two:¶ Vincent Emanuele: Much of the green washing, or capitalism’s attempt to brand itself as green, focuses on localism and anti-government, market-driven programs. Do you think this phobia of the state among the US left is a result of previous failed political experiments? How much of this ideology is imposed from outside forces?¶ Christian Parenti: Some state phobia comes from the American political mythology of rugged individualism; some comes from the fundamentally Southern, Jeffersonian tradition of states’ rights. Fear of the federal government by Southern elites goes back to the founding of the country. The Hamiltonian versus Jeffersonian positions on government are fundamental to understanding American politics. I wrote about this for Jacobin magazine in a piece called "Reading Hamilton from the Left."¶ Lurking just beneath the surface of states’ rights is, of course, plantation rights. Those plantations, places like Monticello, were America’s equivalent of feudal manors where, in a de facto sense, economic, legal and military power were all bound up together and located in the private household of the planter. Those Virginian planters were the original localistas.¶ Nor did that project end with the fall of slavery, or the end of de jure segregation in the 1960s. Southern elites didn’t want Yankees telling them what to do; how to treat their slaves, how to organize their towns, how to run their elections, how to treat the environment – none of that! The South is a resource colony and its regional elites, some of them now running multinational corporations and holding important posts in the US government, believe they have a right to do what they wish with the people and landscape. Historically, that’s a large part of what localism and local democracy meant in the South. It meant that White local elites were "free" – free to push Black people around, free to feed racist fantasies to the White working class. They didn’t want interference from the outside. So, some of that anti-statist ideology comes from that plantation tradition. Another part of it comes from the real failures and crimes of state socialism, though state socialism also had, and in Cuba still has, many successes. The social welfare record of what we used to call "actually existing socialism" was pretty impressive. But there were also the problems of repression, surveillance and bureaucratization, which were partly the result of capitalist encirclement, partly the result of the ideological hubris rooted in ideological overconfidence in the allegedly scientific power of Marxism, partly the result of simple corruption among socialism’s political class. These real problems were central themes in the Cold War West’s educational and ideological apparatus of (generally right-wing) messaging from the press and the political class. In this discourse, communism was the state, while freedom was the private sector. Thus, the United States and freedom became embodied in popular notions of the private sector and individualism.¶ Of course, the great, unmentioned contradiction in this self-fantasy is the fact that American capitalism has always been heavily, heavily dependent on the state. Modern society, despite its fantasies about itself, is intensely cooperative and collective. Look at how complex its physical systems are; that cannot be achieved without massive levels of coordination and collective cooperation, much of it provided by the rules and regulations of government. The knee-jerk anti-statism, what the folks at Jacobin call "anarcho-liberalism," is also rooted in experience. The less social power you have, the more the state is experienced as an invasive, demeaning, oppressive and potentially, very violent bureaucracy. Neoliberalism would not have gotten this far if there wasn’t an element of truth to this critique of its bureaucracy and regulation. It has also used ideas that have old cultural tractions, like freedom.¶ Such are the contradictions of the modern democratic state in capitalist society. Government is rational, supportive, humane, [and offers] redistribution in the form of Social Security, high-quality public schools, environmental regulation, the Voting Rights Act and other federal civil rights laws that have helped break hegemonic power of local and regional bigots. But government is also militarized policing, the bloated prison system, spying on a vast scale; it is child protective services taking children from loving mothers on the basis of bureaucratic traps, corrupt corporate welfare at every level from town government to federal military contracting. The racist, sexist, plutocratic and techno-bureaucratic features of the state create fertile ground for people to turn their backs on the whole idea of government. What has been the impact of the right’s ability to effectively propagandize the White working class in the US?¶ Rightist intellectuals, academics, journalists, media tycoons, university presidents and loudmouth politicians work diligently to capture and form the raw experience of everyday oppression into an ideological common sense. To be clear, I use that term in the Gramscian sense, in which common sense refers to ruling class ideology that is so hegemonic as to be absorbed and naturalized by the people. The constant libertarian assault on the radio, in newspapers, on the television, this drumbeat of anti-government discourse is an old story – but still very important for understanding the anarcho-liberal sensibility. Just tune in to AM radio late on a weekday evening and listen to the anti-government vitriol. It’s sort of wild.¶ Someone could do an interesting study, Ph.D., in unpacking the cultural history of all this. It is tempting to speculate that deindustrialization, having disempowered and made anxious many huge sections of the working class, opens the way for fantasies of empowerment. The anti-statist, rugged individualist common sense is also always simultaneously a fantasy of empowerment. White men are particularly vulnerable to these fantasies. The classic guy who calls into the batshit crazy, late night, right-wing talk radio show is a middle-aged White man. Listen closely to the rage and you hear fantasies of independence. In this rhetoric, guns and gun rights become an obviously phallic symbol of individual empowerment, agency, self worth, responsibility etc. But most importantly, we have to think about how all of this anti-state ideology is being stirred up with investments from elites. The neoliberal project is to transform the state through anti-statist rhetoric and narratives. They sell the idea that people need to be liberated from the state. But then push policies that imprison people while liberating and pampering capital. It is hard for the left to see itself in this sketch – the angry, beaten-down, middle-aged White guy calling in from his basement or garage. But I think these much-documented corporate efforts to build neoliberal consent permeate the entire culture and infect us all, if even just a little bit.¶ This is the intellectually toxic environment in which young activists are approaching the question of the climate emergency. Young activists should be approaching the climate crisis the way the left approached the economic crisis during the Great Depression. We need to drastically restructure the state. We need it mobilized and able to transform the economy. The New Deal was imperfect, of course. It left domestic workers and farm workers out of the Fair Labor Standards Act. It was inherently racist. It dammed rivers and was environmentally destructive. However, the New Deal was radical in its general empowerment of labor; its distributional outcomes were progressive and it achieved a modernizing transformation of American capitalism. Not to overstate the case, but the New Deal could be a reference point for thinking about the beginning of a green transformation that seeks to euthanize the fossil fuel industry. We have to precipitously reduce greenhouse gas emissions and build a new power sector. That much is very clear.¶ However, let me be clear: Shutting down the fossil fuel industry – mitigating the climate crisis – is not a solution for the environmental crisis. Climate change is only one part of the multifaceted environmental crisis. Shutting down the fossil fuel industry would not automatically end overfishing, deforestation, soil erosion, habitat loss, toxification of the environment etc. But carbon mitigation is the most immediately pressing issue we face. The science is very clear on this. Climate change is the portion of the overall crisis that must be solved immediately so as to buy time to deal with all the other aspects of the crisis. Because I take the political implications of climate science very seriously, I am something of a carbon fundamentalist.

#### They can’t win a link turn or permutation – neoliberalism is compatible with various moral orders and regulatory systems – at best the aff is a new vector for an unquestioned framework of neoliberal assumptions

Dardot & Laval 13 (Pierre Dardot, philosopher and specialist in Hegel and Marx, Christian Laval, professor of sociology at the Universite Paris Ouest Nanterre La Defense, *The New Way of the World: On Neoliberal Society*, pgs. 307-310)

As we can see, the strategic character of the apparatus assumes taking account of the historical situations that enable its deployment and which explain a series of readjustments altering it over time and the variety of forms it takes in space. Only on this condition can we understand the ‘turn’ imposed on the rulers of the dominant capitalist countries by the scale of the financial crisis. As we have seen, the latter has initiated a crisis of neo-liberal governmentality. Over and above the initial emergency ‘repairs’ (adoption of new accountancy norms, minimal control of fiscal paradises, reform of ratings agencies, etc.), what beckons is very probably an overall readjustment of the state/market apparatus. To ponder with some economists the possibility of a new ‘regime of capital accumulation’, replacing the financial regime based on excessive household debt, is only natural. To take the risk of deducing from this that a new regime of growth, exploiting mechanisms other than the inflation of property prices and financial assets, will spontaneously coincide with a direct challenge to neoliberal rationality is decidedly imprudent. But to forecast the imminent advent of a ‘good capitalism’ with healthy operational norms, durably anchored in the ‘real economy’, respectful of the environment, attentive to the needs of populations and, why not, concerned for the common good – such unquestionably verges on, if not an edifying tale, than at least an illusion that is just as pernicious as the utopia of a self-regulating market. We are definitely entering a new phase of neo-liberalism. It may be that this phase will be accompanied, ideologically, by a kind of ‘return to the sources’. After all, do not appeals for the ‘restoration of regulated capitalism’ rediscover the accents of the re-founders of the 1930s, counter-posing the good ‘highway code’ of legal rules to the blind ‘natural law’ of the old laissez-fairists? Perhaps – one never knows – under the cover of one of those swings of the pendulum typical of ideology, we shall witness a strong resurgence of the specifically ordo-liberal variant. This is all the less implausible in that, when not purely and simply ignored, it has long been relegated to a subordinate position by its Austro-American competitor.23¶ We would equally miss the strategic character of the neo-liberal apparatus were we to assimilate it to the Gestell of late Heidegger, or the oikonomia of second-century Christian theology, as Agamben indirectly invites us to in What is an Apparatus?24 To speak of a ‘theological genealogy’ of Foucault’s ‘apparatuses’ is to miss the fact that, if the apparatuses actually have ‘no foundation in being’, and if as a result they are fated to ‘produce their subject’, they do not thereby repeat ‘the division … in God between being and action, ontology and praxis’.25 Unlike the government of men by God, which refers to the theological problem of incarnation, they are constituted on the basis of historical conditions that are always unique and contingent and therefore possess an exclusively ‘strategic’, not ‘destinal’ or ‘epochal’, character. On this point[…]“Foucault’s remark about the specificity of the new problematization of government as it emerged between 1580 and 1660. If the activity of governing became a theme, it is because it could no longer find a model ‘outside of God, outside of nature’.26 In other words, far from it being the ‘theological inheritance’ of the government of men and the world by God which explains why the government of men by men becomes a problem, it was in fact the crisis of the model God’s ‘pastoral government’ of the world that freed up reflection on the art of governing men. What is valid for the emergence of the general problem of government also applies to the constitution of the specifically neo-liberal form of governmentality. The latter is neither the inevitable sequel to the regime of capital accumulation, nor an avatar of the general logic of the Incarnation, nor a mysterious ‘envoi of Being’, any more than it is a mere intellectual doctrine or an ephemeral form of ‘false consciousness’.¶ Nevertheless, neo-liberal rationality can be combined with ideologies that are alien to pure market logic, without thereby ceasing to be the dominant rationality. As Wendy Brown aptly puts it[…] ‘neoliberalism can become dominant as governmentality without being dominant as ideology’.27 No doubt this does not occur without tensions or contradictions. In this regard, the US example is rich in lessons. There neo-conservatism has become established as the standard ideology of the New Right, even though ‘the high moral tone’ of this ideology seems incompatible with the ‘amoral’ character of neo-liberal rationality.28 A superficial analysis might suggest that we are in the presence of ‘double dealing’. In reality, there is an accord between neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism that is by no means fortuitous. If neo-liberal rationality promotes the enterprise to the rank of model of subjectivation, it is only to the extent that the enterprise-form is the ‘cell-form’ for moralizing the working individual, just as the family is the ‘cell-form’ for moralizing the child.29 Hence the non-stop eulogizing of the calculating and responsible individual, invariably in the shape of the working, thrifty and provident father of a family, which aids dismantlement of pension, public education and health systems. Much more than a mere ‘zone of contact’, the articulation of the enterprise with the family represents the point of convergence or overlap between neo-liberal normativity and neo-conservative moralism. That is why it is always dangerous to criticize moral and cultural conservatism in the name of the alleged ‘liberalism’ of its supporters in economic policy. For, in seeking to expose their ‘inconsistency’, one ends up revealing incomprehension of the difference between neo-liberalism and ‘laissez-fairism’ and, in addition, runs the risk of having to assume a kind of integral, systematic laissez-fairism to salvage the coherence of the critique.¶ However, the accord between neo-conservatism and neo-liberalism in no way entails that an ideological amalgam, combining ingredients from different sources, might not turn up to take over from an intellectual current that is largely anaemic today. The Blairite Left has already shown in the past that lyrical celebration of modernity in all its aspects, including the liberalization of mores, can perfectly well be combined with neo-liberal rationality. The possibility cannot be excluded that on another level – economic policy – certain elements of Keynesian doctrine will supply the practice of entrepreneurial government with reinforcement: temporary budgetary reflation, provisional bracketing of the criteria of monetary stability, measures aimed at checking market speculation, and so forth – all of them elements that do not involve touching the basic distribution of income between capital and labour and thereby reactivating a wage compromise comparable to the post-war one. By itself, however, such purely circumstantial and ‘pragmatic’ cooperation is not such as to dent the normative logic of neo-liberalism, so true is it that the latter can only be defeated by large-scale upheavals.

#### 2 — Focus on micro-level, individual change does not spill up — defending substantive political commitments resolves their impacts better

Luxon 14 — Nancy Luxon 14, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, 2014, “Caring for the In-between Space of Politics: Myers’ Worldly Ethics,” Theory & Event, Vol. 17, No. 3

There is a danger in believing that the dynamics of micro-level interactions are identical to those that characterize macro- political and economic structures – these interactions “risk being captured by prevailing habits and beliefs that can render arts of the self nondemocratic, even antidemocratic” (47). Instead, Myers urges a turn to those “public processes of politicization” that are key for the “activation and subsequent direction” of associative action (51). The concern for these public processes likewise motivates Myers’ critique of Butler and Critchley in their different appropriations of Levinasian ethics. If Connolly individualizes ethical claims, Myers argues that Butler shifts them to a pre-political, ontological register while Critchley moves too seamlessly from Levinasian charity to associative democracy. In each case “the movement… to democratic activity, from individual concern for the Other to shared concern for worldly conditions, is glossed over, assumed rather than accounted for” (82). Myers neatly charts the elisions that permit each thinker to ignore the political conditions necessary for strong ethical claims, and so to presume that once individuals affirm such claims, somehow a better political contest will follow. Myers laudably refuses this presumption. In developing a democratic politics of care in Chapter Three, Myers hopes instead to place the accent on associative interactions. “The practitioner of such care is never a self,” she writes, “but always an association of selves” (86). Likewise, the recipient of care is plural, or on Myers’ terms, it is “the world understood as the array of material and immaterial conditions under which human beings live. […] It is the third term – a practice, place, law, habit, or event – around which people gather, both in solidarity and division” (86). Differently from other theorists, Myers extends this conception of ‘world’ beyond the material to argue we have missed something “vital to democratic politics, and that is the central role played by things” (86). These are “the focal points of both cooperative and competitive modes of association” rather than any fixed, shared identity or singular principles. For Myers, publics “are constituted as a collective by what divides them” (108) – that is, by the inequalities that define public life. Myers gives us an associative life far richer than any aggregation of individuals, one insistently motivated by an ethos of care oriented towards materiality as well as mediated relationships, and one irreducible to individualist ethics. Insistently, this ethos pushes persons to define and defend more substantive political commitments. Myers finishes in Chapter Four with the claim that this care for the world has two ends: to make the world a home for what Judith Butler might call “liveable lives” and for the in-between space of mediated relationships that is politics. In regards to the first end, the world serves as a “third term” that invests persons in the differences they hold in common, and has an ineluctable material dimension. “More specifically,” Myers writes, “in order for humans to be at home in the world, certain of their basic needs must be met. Collaborative pursuit of this aim of universal provision of basic needs is part of what it means to care for the world as world” (113). To think through these needs in their material and associative dimensions, Myers turns alternately to Arendt’s conception of ‘world’; to the ‘new materialisms’ literature and its approach to commonality; and finally to Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum’s work on the capabilities approach to justice. She draws on these interlocutors less to offer clear models for associative action, than to begin puzzling through the qualities that such interactions should have. Myers makes a compelling case that political theorists need to focus more pointedly on collective action, and that we should begin with contextualized, political relations rather than cultivating rarefied judgments or ethical dispositions and presuming that the “right” politics will follow. Her care for the world embraces political projects at once critical and programmatic, and goes a long way towards broadening the conditions of political action beyond individual judgment. Left provocatively unanswered, is how her own ethos of care might retain a critical edge that attends to vulnerabilities without stabilizing some notion of “the human.” In her discussion of materiality, for example, Myers’ account moves between the literatures on new materialisms and human capabilities, without examining the ontological or epistemological differences between the two, or the different politics currently associated with each. Concerned that the new materialisms approach is largely “redescriptive” (111), Myers turns to Sen and Nussbaum for an approach to commonality with greater political and normative bite.

## Case

#### 3 — Both political demands on the state and reform are inevitable – not working through the system dooms identity to the status quo

Peter Campbell 13, faculty member in the Program in Composition, Literacy, Pedagogy, and Rhetoric at the University of Pittsburgh, JUDICIAL RHETORIC AND RADICAL POLITICS: SEXUALITY, RACE, AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/handle/2142/45352/Peter\_Campbell.pdf?sequence=1

But—following Matsuda—I think that Butler seems to miss an important point. Given the material force of the fantasy of legal sovereignty in the margins, “‘at the point[s]’” where power is “‘completely invested in its real and effective practices,’” 31 I argue that resistance to the idea of legal sovereignty must not preclude what Cathy Cohen might call a “practical”32 understanding of the presently inevitable reality of the sovereign rhetorical operations of the law. The political project of resistance to the performative sovereignty of judicial rhetoric in the United States must not deny (as Matsuda and Richard Delgado said in 1987 to the “crits” of Critical Legal Studies) the need to construct strategically informed and tactically sound responses to those “formal” structures of law that already act as and with the material power of sovereign authority––authority over the constraints that legal forms of subjectivity already impose on personhood.33 As Butler herself acknowledges in 2004,34 the absolute critique of legal sovereign performatives does not adequately consider how the effects of the fantasy of legal sovereignty are most often (and most often most terribly) felt by “those who have” actually “seen and felt the falsity of the liberal promise”35 of the U.S. judiciary as a shield against domination.¶ My experience of the law has occurred through my own participation in and observation of judicial sovereignty––both from a majoritarian perspective. I teach argumentation in a prison, a setting that emphasizes the paradoxical and simultaneous vitality and uselessness of rhetorical and argumentative interaction with those persons charged with enforcing the reasoned justification of judicial decision through coercive violence. In our present democratic state of laws, the production of legitimacy for judicial sovereignty through argument, and the production of legitimacy through force, work together in explicit and mutually supportive fashion. More happily, I was recently invited by two friends to officiate their wedding, at a ceremony in Rehoboth, Massachusetts. I agreed, and asked whether I should purchase an ordination online, so that I could legally perform the ceremony. There was no need— Massachusetts is unusual among U.S. states in maintaining a category of officiant called a “solemnizer.” Any person, with little qualification, can apply to be a solemnizer. The dichotomy between the “republican style”36 of the application process, and the quotidian ease with which I was granted the certificate made me think about the “sovereign performative”37 that I would stage in Rehoboth. The “I do” statement in a marriage ceremony is one of Austin’s core examples38 of an “illocutionary” performative, an utterance which “has a certain force” in the “saying” of it,39 but this example itself performs an interesting elision of the role of a state representative in a civil marriage ceremony. In Rehoboth, my friends would not be married until I pronounced them so publicly. That pronouncement would of course require other performative statements (“I do”) from my friends as a pre-requisite to its validity.40 But on the date and in the location specified by the solemnization certificate, I had, as a feature of the designation “solemnizer” bestowed on me by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, absolute power over whether they would be married or not—on that date and in that location. In the narrow context of the two possible realities of my friends becoming married or not on that day and in that location, my role was to exercise the sovereign performative power of the Commonwealth as its judge-like representative. ¶ But in that exercise, I would also be performing two arguments: one for the sovereign legitimacy (and successful performativity)41 of my utterances and the illegitimacy of any others; and one for the value and significance of “married” as a position of legal subjectivity in Massachusetts and the United States. I bring up this example to emphasize the specifically illocutionary power of the judicial rhetorical constitution of subjects before law. Austin describes illocution as “‘in saying x I was doing y’ or ‘I did y,’”42 but judicial illocution might more accurately be described as “in saying x I did x.” When I said that these people were married, I made them married. The statement and the doing were one and the same. If a judge sentences a person to death, she does not depress the needle; the pronouncement of sentence is an illocutionary act in the first sense (x and y). But in pronouncing the sentence, the judge does redefine the convicted (of a death-eligible crime) person’s subjectivity before law from “convicted” and/or “criminal” and/or “felon” and/or “murderer” and/or “traitor” to, more primarily, “condemned.” This is an illocutionary act in the second sense (x and x).¶ If a judge rules that it is unconstitutional to require a trans\* person’s passport to list their gender contrary to that person’s “self-understanding,”43 this is a “perlocutionary” act (where the utterance effectively causes something to happen)44 in that the ruling enables the person who is trans\* to change the official designation of their gender. But it is also an x and x illocutionary act in the context of the petitioner’s subjectivity before law—the utterance of the ruling has changed their self-understanding of their own identity from “not real” to “real” in the eyes of the law. This would be even more evident if the ruling did not merely realize the truth of a trans\* person’s self-understanding as male or female, but went so far as to create, in the moment of the utterance itself, a legally recognized trans\* identity category. ¶ All of these examples are performatives enabled by the fantasy of the sovereign location of power in law. When asked, I considered (given my own views on marriage as an institution) declining to perform the ceremony—even in Massachusetts, whose marriage laws mean that the sexual orientation identity of the two people I married cannot be discerned from this story. I understood that my performative and the discourse of the ceremony surrounding it would contribute in a small way to the sovereign power of the state over human relational and sexual legitimacy. But this refusal would not have made the present sovereignty of the state over the determination of legally legitimate and illegitimate forms of relation any less inevitable.¶ Petitions to the law are inevitable; they will be made, often by people with no other recourse to save their life, or to preserve their life's basic quality. As Butler demonstrates, any such petition will have performative effect. I do not offer this brief critique of Butler’s theory of “sovereign performatives” to dispute the facticity of her arguments. I begin this project with the stipulation that politics of resistance to the “sovereign performative” must include actions of resistance to statist law itself—that is, the specific articulation of opposition, within progressive social movements, to strategies that privilege appeals for help from judges. But these politics must also acknowledge that those who undertake such strategies do not always do so without knowledge of the sovereign performative function of their actions—“recourse to the law” does not always or even usually “imagine” the law “as neutral.”45 These radical politics must also be undertaken with knowledge of the effects of the petitions to law-as-sovereign that will inevitably be made—and particularly with knowledge of the effects that flow from the (also performative and also inevitable) judicial rhetorical responses to these inevitable petitions. ¶ Austin teaches us that it is in the nature of performatives to not always work, and to produce effects in excess of their explicit ones. The judicial rhetorical constitution of subject and abject forms of being-in-relation to law operates through legal performatives that contain the possibilities for their own future “infelicity.”46 My project is an attempt to explore some future possibilities for the counter-sovereign articulation of subjectivity before U.S. law—possibilities that are both foreclosed and engendered in the argumentative justifications for judicial decisions. Specifically, I examine some key Supreme Court cases relating to sexual practice, race in education policy, and marriage. I perform a legal rhetorical criticism of critic-constructed “meta”-texts47 that form argumentative frameworks through which judges apply various legal doctrines to questions of sexual, racial, educational, and relational freedom.¶ Following Perelman, I understand judicial argument to be the explanatory justifications offered for judges’ authoritative interpretive application of legal doctrine to problems of public concern––problems that have been framed as legal, either by jurists themselves, petitioners to the courts, or both. In the United States, judicial arguments about constitutional interpretation have the privileged function of delimiting the grounds on which the authority of all other statist legal argument is based. Given the overwhelming salience of constitutional legal discourse in U.S. everyday life,48 this means that the judicial rhetoric of constitutional law plays a significant role in delimiting the grounds on which a person can base their claim—literally49––to existence and legitimacy in the U.S. polity.50 Jurists’ arguments from and about the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution in particular perform a final arbitration function in the ongoing and generally contentious process of the statist determination of what forms of racialized queer identity and relation will be eligible for recognized and legitimated status in U.S. public life. ¶ In this dissertation, I focus on the Fourteenth Amendment—due process and equal protection—rhetoric of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Anthony M. Kennedy. I read this rhetoric in terms of “genealogies of precedent,” or the argumentative possibilities for queer subjectivity before law that are brought into being by the doctrinal frameworks Kennedy and other judicial rhetors use in a given opinion. Each chapter offers a case study of opinions in several Federal and Supreme Court cases that are foundational to Kennedy’s development of a new constitutional jurisprudence of substantive due process and equality. I demonstrate that this jurisprudence is both productive of and violent to possibilities for practical and strategic sexually “progressive”51 interactions with U.S. constitutional law. These interactions, despite their practical or strategic formulation, can be undertaken and/or framed in terms of anti-statist and institutional radical queer political goals. Possibilities for the success of such radical framing of practical interaction are partially delimited in the argumentative choice of U.S. judicial opinions.